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1. Introduction 
Recent accounting scandals like Groupon’s inflating earnings 1  and Green Mountain 
Coffee’s aggressive financial reporting 2  have attracted much attention from the public and 
academia, retriggering a call for action on corporate governance reforms. An article in the Wall 
Street Journal by Francesco Guerrera (October 1, 2012) states that “it is an open secret” that 
companies use various types of accounting instruments to manipulate earnings.3 According to a 
recent survey of 169 chief financial officers (CFOs) in public firms by Dichev, Graham, Harvey, 
and Rajgopal (2013), 20% of firms manages earnings to misrepresent performance, and the 
magnitude of the misrepresentation is around 10% of earnings per share in any given period. 
Mispresenting performance through earnings management represents a failure in sufficiently 
reflecting a firm’s economic position and accurately communicating with external stakeholders 
(e.g., Healy and Wahlen, 1999); such activity implies, at least in part, that insiders extract private 
benefits at the expense of other stakeholders (e.g., Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003). Therefore, 
it is of great practical importance to understand the underlying causes of earnings management 
and financial reporting bias. While numerous empirical studies have emphasized the effects of 
equity incentives on earnings manipulation and misreporting (e.g., Bergstresser and Phillippon, 
2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Jiang, Petroni and Wang, 2010), the balance of power between the 
chief executive officer (CEO) and CFO has received much less attention.   
In this paper, I focus on CEO power over CFOs and investigate the effects of shifts in 
bargaining power on financial reporting quality. I use a unique dataset of nationwide CFO awards 
                                                            
1 In March 2012, Groupon revised its 4th quarter earnings. According to the revision, the earnings were inflated by 
$14.3 million. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303816504577313983768173826 
2 In November 2010, Green Mountain announced a total overstatement of $10.1 million in pre-tax income. The 
company conceded material weaknesses in internal controls and restated its financial reports issued from 2007 to 
2010 to correct its errors. http://whitecollarfraud.blogspot.com/2010/12/green-mountain-coffee-roasters-time-to.html 
3 http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444138104578030353195160818 
that recognize CFO excellence as exogenous shocks to awardees’ career opportunities and 
bargaining power. Specifically, I employ the “America’s Best CFOs” awards granted between 
2004 and 2012 by Institutional Investor magazine, a well-known business magazine famous for 
providing research and rankings that “serve as respected industry benchmarks.”4  I find that, 
compared to a group of benchmark non-awardees, awardee CFOs experience a notable increase in 
career opportunities and a substantial decrease in CEO power over them. Consistent with the 
argument that the balance of bargaining power between the CEO and CFO benefits the quality of 
financial reporting, I find that, relative to both non-awardees and pre-award periods, awardees’ 
firms have a significantly lower level of earnings management, as measured by the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals.  
Why would the balance of power between CEOs and CFOs matter for financial reporting 
quality? Because CEOs have strong incentives to manage earnings, need cooperation from the 
CFO due to their job responsibilities, and are able to use their power to force the CFO to cooperate 
when he/she is reluctant to commit manipulation. Specifically, CEOs, whose compensation is 
largely based on equity, can greatly benefit from manipulating short-term stock prices (e.g., Cheng 
and Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). Since CEOs do not directly participate in 
the process of preparing financial reporting, they need cooperation from the CFO to initiate 
manipulation. However, the CFO, as the responsible person in financial reporting, may not always 
be willing to cooperate. Economic theory of crime (Becker, 1968) suggests that people commit 
crime when the expected outcome is greater than the expected costs of being detected and punished. 
On one hand, CFOs have a substantially lower portion of equity-based compensation than their 
                                                            
4 See Institutional Investor magazine website: http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Institutional-Investor-
Magazine.html#.VorILsYrLRY 
CEOs, leading to smaller equity incentives to manage earnings. On the other hand, CFOs bear 
considerable costs after being detected in earnings manipulation, including potential job turnover 
(Hennes, Leone, and Miller, 2008), loss of reputation, and legal punishment (Feng, Ge, Luo, and 
Shevlin, 2011). Moreover, unlike their CEOs who may use the excuse of being less informed about 
transaction details and who may have the power to scapegoat their subordinates,5 CFOs can hardly 
defend themselves for involvement in manipulations as they are directly in charge of preparing 
financial reports. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that in some cases CFOs are reluctant to 
commit earnings management as the costs may exceed the private financial gains from doing so. 
In this context, CEOs may exert pressure on CFOs to flatter or depress earnings to satisfy their 
own desires. They can do so because they are CFOs’ direct supervisors (McAnally, Weaver, and 
Srivastava, 2008) and have considerable influence on CFO retention decisions (Mian, 2001; Fee 
and Hadlock, 2004). This analysis is consistent with Friedman’s (2014) theoretical model of CEO 
power and earnings bias, in which powerful CEOs are more likely to force their CFOs to commit 
an upward bias in financial reporting. It is also supported by a large body of evidence from the 
field. For instance, Dichev et al. (2013) document that 91% of surveyed CFOs faces inside pressure 
to influence stock prices. Another survey of 141 public firm CFOs by CFO magazine shows that 
17% of the respondents has been pressured to misrepresent accounting results by their CEOs 
during the past five years.6  
If CFOs have sufficient outside career opportunities, the bargaining power is expected to 
shift from CEOs to them. This is in the spirit of Rajan and Zingales’ (1998) theoretical work about 
the access to critical resource and power, which suggests that agents exert ex ante efforts in 
                                                            
5 For instance, Leone and Liu (2010) find that CFOs are more likely to face turnover after accounting irregularities 
when the CEO is the founder. Burks (2010) finds that, after a financial restatement, CFOs are more frequently 
removed from their positions than CEOs. 
6 Ronald Fink, 2002. The Fear of All Sums. http://ww2.cfo.com/risk-compliance/2002/08/the-fear-of-all-sums/ 
specializing their human capital, a critical resource for the organization, and gain ex post 
bargaining power from control over it. To CFOs, the knowledge of firm-specific information and 
associated financial experience are critical human capital and their withdrawal would reduce the 
economic rent of the company. Accordingly, CFOs with sufficient external opportunities are not 
only less concerned about losing their current job, but also gain the ability to withhold their human 
capital, leading to an increase in their bargaining power and their ability to mitigate the pressure 
from the CEO. If CEO power over the CFO is a cause of earnings management, one would expect 
the shifts of power between CEOs and CFOs to induce a lower level of earnings management. 
An empirical challenge in exploring the effects of the balance of power is the difficulty of 
directly observing the CFO job-market status and the bargaining power between CEOs and CFOs. 
To address this issue, I use prestigious national CFO awards (the “America’s Best CFOs” awards) 
to capture exogenous shocks to CFOs' career opportunities. My approach allows me to detect 
changes in awardee CFOs’ labor market status and the consequent changes in their bargaining 
power relative to the CEOs, providing an experiment to explore how the balance of power affects 
earnings management. 
I first validate whether the CFO awards affect awardees’ job-market status. Since the career 
opportunities of an awardee had he/she not received the award cannot be observed, I use the 
propensity-score matching (PSM) approach, as in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), to construct a 
benchmark control group to mitigate potential selection bias. Specifically, I match each CFO 
awardee with a group of non-awardees who hold a CFO position as of the award month and have 
a similar propensity of winning the award. Then I compare the ex post career opportunities between 
awardees and matched non-awardees. Consistent with previous findings on award effects on CEO 
and director status (Malmendier and Tate, 2009; Chen, Wu, and Zhivotova, 2016), I document that 
awardee CFOs, compared to matched non-awardee CFOs, are more likely to gain a higher paid 
position in another firm, to become the CEO of another firm, or to move to a more prestigious firm. 
I also find that awardees retained in their current firms are more likely to be promoted to executive 
director, chief operating officer (COO), president, or CEO. In addition, they experience a large 
jump in their total compensation, mainly attributed to a larger proportion of stock and option grants. 
These results suggest that not only does the external labor market provide better career 
opportunities to awardees, but current employers also attempt to retain these super stars by 
enhancing the chance of internal promotion, improving total compensation, and increasing the 
amount of equity grants. The increase in job opportunities in both external and internal labor 
markets substantially decreases awardees’ career concerns. Given that the main power a CEO has 
over the CFO is to influence his/her compensation, promotion, and retention (Matejka, 2007), 
awardees who become less concerned about losing their current job have increasing ability to 
withhold their human capital and thus gain more bargaining power with their CEOs. In the spirit 
of previous literature (e.g., Adams, Almeida, and Ferrerira, 2005; Feng, Ge, Luo, and Shevlin, 
2011; Heater, 2016), I develop a CEO power index to partially measure CEO power over CFOs. I 
find that awardees’ firms have a considerably lower CEO power index than non-awardees and pre-
award periods. Since awardees receive considerably more stock and option grants, I also explore 
the changes in CEO equity incentives. I find a significant increase in awardees’ delta (the dollar 
change in the wealth associated with a 1% change in the firm’s stock price) and pay-for-
performance sensitivity (PPS). 
Having confirmed that CFO awards represent substantial shocks to awardees’ labor market 
opportunities, compensation, and bargaining power, I then examine the consequent effects of the 
shifts in power between CEOs and CFOs on earnings management. On one hand, winning the 
award provides CFOs with better job opportunities, significantly enlarging their bargaining power 
relative to the CEO. On the other hand, awardee firms increase the portion of stock and option 
grants, leading to a substantial increase in the CFO’s PPS. Previous literature suggests that equity 
incentives encourage CFOs to initiate earnings management. Unless the effects of equity 
incentives can be offset by the shifts in power between CEOs and CFOs, one would expect awardee 
firms to manipulate more than non-awardees. In other words, a decrease in earnings management 
in awardee firms would provide clear evidence of the effect of the balance of power. 
Following prior studies (e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Jiang et al., 2010), I use 
the absolute value of discretionary accruals as a proxy for the magnitude of earnings management. 
As one component of earnings, accruals have no first-order effect on current cash flows and allow 
managers to use discretion in deciding its construction. Therefore, accruals management becomes 
a common way for managers to bias earnings. I estimate fixed effect models to investigate the 
effects of CFO awards on the magnitude of discretionary accruals. In addition to controlling for 
common firm and individual attributes that may influence accruals management, I also control for 
CFO and CEO PPS because prior work shows that equity incentives of both CEOs and CFOs are 
strongly associated with earnings management. Consistent with the view that the balance of power 
between CEOs and CFOs matters in earnings management, I find that awardees’ firms have, on 
average, 47 basis points less in discretionary accruals relative to both non-awardees and pre-award 
periods, significant at the 1% level. Because the absolute value of discretionary accruals cannot 
completely capture the changes in the level of accruals management,7  I also include signed 
discretionary accruals in my main tests. Consistent with Friedman’s model in which powerful 
                                                            
7 For instance, changes in the absolute value cannot completely capture the changes in the sign of discretionary 
accruals. 
CEOs are more likely to push earnings management upward, the balance of power (winning the 
award) has a significant and negative effect on signed accruals (37 basis points). Further dividing 
the sample into positive and negative accruals, I find that the award has a significant and negative 
effect on positive abnormal accruals and a less significant positive effect on negative accruals.  
If the decrease in the CEO’s relative bargaining power is the main channel of the reduction 
in discretionary accruals, one would expect a difference between firms with different levels of 
CEO bargaining power. When a firm has a less powerful CEO, winning the award may have a 
limited marginal effect on earnings management as the CEO already has weak influence over the 
CFO. Consistent with this prediction, I find that the award effects are significant only when CFOs 
face powerful CEOs. In the subsample of powerful CEOs, winning the award reduces the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals by 58 basis points, significant at the 1% level. In contrast, the 
award effect is smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant in the less powerful CEO group. 
Similarly, I find a significant and negative effect of the award on the three year changes in the 
magnitude of abnormal accruals in the powerful CEO group, while the effect in the less powerful 
CEO group is insignificant both statistically and economically. In addition, I find weak evidence 
that, after awardees’ departure, their successors engage in a higher level abnormal accruals. Firms 
that hire an awardee exhibit a smaller magnitude of discretionary accruals. These robustness-check 
results provide support for my main conclusion. 
To further mitigate potential bias in my estimates arising from the possible endogeneity of 
the awards, I instrument the likelihood of a firm being in a post-award period as the number of 
analysts who included the firm in their buy/sell recommendations within a five-year window 
before a given year. I use the lagged two-year number to generate a time gap between 
recommendations and the year of interest. According to the award organizer, the award results are 
based on surveys that ask investment professionals to nominate candidates in their coverage 
universes. The instrument is relevant because it partially measures how many analysts know a 
company and its executives. Meanwhile, I argue the instrument is excludable. This is because (1) 
being mentioned by more analysts does not necessarily mean better performance as analysts have 
different opinions (e.g., buy, hold, and sell) and different focuses, (2) the number of 
recommendations is added up in a five-year window, a relatively long period during which analysts’ 
views can vary from year to year, and (3) these recommendations represent analysts’ points of 
view three to seven years ago, leaving a long time gap which can considerably impair the predictive 
power of these past recommendations on a firm’s current level of discretionary accruals. A two-
stage least squares (2SLS) regression including fixed effects provides similar results, suggesting 
that the documented award effects on discretionary accruals are not driven by uncontrolled firm or 
individual attributes.   
One concern is that awardees may become less involved in earnings management due to 
an increase in external pressure and/or internal monitoring. Intuitively, winning an award brings 
substantial fame and visibility to awardees, making the market expect high quality in their financial 
reporting and creating more surprise about disclosed earnings management by awardee firms. 
Therefore, awardee CFOs may be pressured to maintain high-quality financial reporting to prevent 
a loss of reputation. The board of directors, at the same time, may audit financial reports by 
awardees more intensively as they receive more stock and options and have higher equity 
incentives than before. It is possible that awardees, under monitoring by their board, reduce the 
level of accruals management for the post-award period to avoid punishment. To address these 
concerns, I first explore how the market reacts to earnings restatements by sample companies. 
Since the public does not know whether an earnings restatement is fraud related or not at the 
moment of the announcement, the market must assess the detriment of the restatement based on 
current information. Since awardees have built a reputation as high-quality CFOs, the market is 
more likely to view their restatements as non-fraud related. In addition, the market may also expect 
award winners whose bargaining power considerably increases to be less concerned about 
disclosing previous mistakes and thus restate frequently given a certain volume of previous 
reporting errors. These expectations might help offset the surprise brought by the restatements of 
awardee firms, leading to a smaller market reaction. Consistent with this analysis, I find that, while 
non-awardees have considerably negative cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for all the event 
windows, the market has a relatively weaker reaction to restatements by awardees’ firms. As a 
next step, I examine the award effects on the number of non-reliance financial restatements. I find 
some evidence that awardee firms restate less than non-awardee firms and pre-award periods, 
suggesting that awardees are not audited more intensively by their board. An alternative 
explanation for this result is that awardees, as high-quality CFOs, make fewer errors in the first 
place. If so, we would observe awardee firms restating less when the error is made by the current 
CFO, but would not expect a significant difference between awardees and non-awardees when the 
error is attributable to the predecessors. Therefore, I separately look at restatements that are due to 
mistakes made by the current CFO and his/her predecessors. I find that firms of past awardees 
restate less when predecessors are accountable for the errors, while the results are insignificant 
when the current CFO is imputed. Overall, there is no evidence that my main results are driven by 
awardees being more intensively audited by their firms. 
My study contributes to the literature in several respects. First, my work provides evidence 
of how the balance of power between CEOs and CFOs affects financial reporting quality. A large 
body of studies explores how managers’ equity incentives affect financial fraud, earnings 
management, and financial misreporting. Johnson, Ryan, and Tian (2009) show that equity-based 
compensation, especially unrestricted stockholdings, provides managers with incentives to commit 
fraud. Bergstresser and Phillippon (2006) and Burns and Kedia (2006) focus on CEO equity 
incentives and find that such incentives are positively related to earnings management and 
misreporting. In contrast, Jiang et al. (2010) and Chava and Purnanaham (2010) suggest that 
accruals management is associated with the CFO’s equity incentives rather than the CEO’s. Some 
evidence suggests that CEO bargaining power also matters. Feng et al. (2011) document that firms 
with significant financial manipulations, as indicated by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) have similar CFO equity 
incentives but more powerful CEOs than matched counterparts. Friedman (2014) constructs a 
theoretical model of CEO power over the CFO in which firms with powerful CEOs are more likely 
to overestimate earnings. A challenge in empirically examining these propositions comes from 
potential endogeneity issues. For example, a powerful CEO may be able to intentionally increase 
the proportion of stock and options in the CFO’s compensation package and make him/her willing 
to cooperate. My study employs an exogenous shock to CFO job-market status which impairs CEO 
power relative to the CFO while increasing CFO equity incentives, yielding clean tests on how the 
balance of power affects earnings management. Moreover, this paper links managerial labor 
markets to earnings management, providing evidence of the effects of CFO career opportunities 
in offsetting CEO bargaining power and reducing manipulation. To the best of my knowledge, this 
is the first work to study precisely the interaction of CFO career opportunities and the balance of 
power between CEOs and CFOs with financial reporting quality.  
My work also sheds light on the channel through which CEOs can manipulate earnings. 
Existing literature documents a significant relation between CEO equity incentives and earnings 
management (e.g., Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser and Phillippon, 2006). However, it is 
not clear how CEOs respond to such incentives and initiate manipulation. My results suggest that 
the influence of the CEO on subordinates’ career opportunities may force CFOs to manipulate 
earnings in response to CEOs’ desires. This finding has important implications for current 
corporate governance reform, suggesting that the balance of power between CEOs and CFOs is an 
important factor when considering financial reporting quality. Firms may benefit from increasing 
CFO independence, adding positions (e.g., chief audit officer) which can provide support for the 
CFO’s independence, and balancing the CEO’s power in subordinates’ hiring, compensation, and 
turnover decisions. 
Moreover, my study adds to the existing literature on managerial labor markets. Fama 
(1980) argues that pressure from the outside labor market provides discipline to managers, 
motivating them to build a good reputation of working hard in the interest of their shareholders. 
Existing literature on managerial/director labor markets provides support for the labor market 
discipline arguments (e.g., Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins, 2003; Fee and Hadlock, 2004; Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2007; Chen et al., 2016). In contrast, my findings suggest that CFOs’ career concerns 
may drive them to please CEOs rather than to benefit shareholders in the context of the interfirm 
hierarchy. In addition, my findings provide evidence of the use of compensation contracting to 
retain managerial talent. Based on group compensation and firm performance, previous literature 
reports mixed evidence of the effects of “golden handcuffs” in locking superior managers into their 
current employers (e.g., Mehran and Yermack, 1997; Fee and Hadlock, 2003). My study, in 
comparison, employs an exogenous shock to individual reputation and suggests that current 
employers tend to grant more stock and options to outstanding managers.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops hypotheses for 
empirical tests. Section 3 describes my data set and provides details on sample construction and 
key variables. Section 4 presents my empirical results and discusses treatment of endogeneity 
issues. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Hypotheses Development 
I start by analyzing the impacts of winning the award on awardees’ career opportunities. 
As Frey and Neckermann (2010) show, awards in recognition of excellence function as signals of 
unobservable individual dedication and ability. As long as the award results are not perfectly 
predictable, the award conveys new information to the market about an awardee’s individual 
characteristics, such as effort and talent. Given the existence of an active external labor market, 
awardees are viewed as highly favored job candidates. In other words, if an award received 
represents a substantial shock to reputation capital, the award brings more outside career 
opportunities to awardees. To examine this proposition, an ideal test would compare the awardee’s 
career opportunities to the opportunities of the same person had he/she not received the award. 
Since the counterfactual cannot be observed, I use a propensity-score matching (PSM) approach 
proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to match each awardee with a group of non-awardees 
who hold a CFO position as of the award month and have a similar predicted possibility of winning 
the award. Then I compare the ex post career opportunities between awardees and matched non-
awardees. The analysis and empirical strategy lead to the following hypothesis:  
H1: Compared to matched non-awardees, awardees experience an ex post increase in 
outside job opportunities. 
Despite an increase in potential outside offers, an awardee does not have to join another 
firm as long as his/her compensation and promotion opportunity in the current company increase 
to an equivalent level. In some cases, awardees’ current employers are willing to provide the 
reward because the specialized human capital of these job-market stars are in precious and its 
withdrawal could lead to a decrease in economic rent. Accordingly, an awardee who is retained in 
the current company is expected to experience a significant increase in internal promotion and total 
compensation caused by the increase in external job opportunities. In addition, current employers 
may appropriately redesign the compensation package of an awardee, increasing the proportion of 
options and restricted stocks (“golden handcuffs”) in the total compensation to “lock” him/her into 
the current position (e.g., Jackson and Lazear, 1991; Scholes, 1991; Mehran and Yermack, 1997; 
Fee and Hadlock, 2003; Oyer, 2004). Therefore, I expect an awardee to face a significant increase 
in internal promotion likelihood, total compensation, and stock/option grants in his/her 
compensation package.  
H2A: Compared to matched non-awardees, awardees experience an increase in the 
likelihood of being promoted to a higher level position inside the firm. 
H2B: Compared to their matched counterparts, awardees who stay in the current firm 
experience an increase in total compensation and in stock and option grants. 
According to Rajan and Zingales’ (1998) framework, employees gain bargaining power 
over employers through the ability to withhold their human capital inputs. Though the CEO has 
critical influence over the CFO’s compensation and retention (Matejka, 2007), awardee CFOs who 
experience a notable increase in external job opportunities might gain bargaining power from the 
improved ability to withdraw their specialized human capital (e.g., experience and knowledge 
associated with firm-specific information) from the current firm. In other words, awardees who 
become less concerned about losing their current jobs have increasing bargaining power relative 
to their CEOs. While we cannot directly observe CEO power over CFOs, we can indirectly 
measure it through factors that may influence their relationship. In the spirit of previous studies 
(e.g., Adams et al., 2005; Feng et al., 2011; Heater, 2016), I construct a CEO power index (CEO 
PI) which includes relative age, directorship, number of titles, founder status, and stock ownership. 
This index partially reflects how powerful the CEO is in relation to the CFO and is expected to be 
lower for awardees than for non-awardees. I formalize this hypothesis as follows: 
H3: When a CFO wins the award, the CEO’s power relative to the CFO becomes smaller 
and the CEO PI decreases. 
Next, I develop hypotheses about how changes in CFO bargaining power influence 
earnings management. If CEO power is a cause of earnings management, one would expect to 
observe a lower level of earnings management in awardees’ firms since awardees have gained 
larger bargaining power relative to their CEOs. In the spirit of previous literature (e.g., Bergstresser 
and Phillipon, 2006), I use the magnitude of discretionary accruals to measure the level of earnings 
management. I expect awardees’ firms to have less discretionary accruals than non-awardees and 
pre-award periods. Moreover, if the shift in power between CEOs and CFOs is the channel for the 
decrease in earnings management, the award effect should differ among firms with different levels 
of CEO bargaining power. For firms with powerful CEOs, the award effect is expected to be 
significant because the decrease in CEO power reduces the CEO’s influence over the CFO to fiddle 
with earnings. In contrast, winning the award may not significantly affect firms with less powerful 
CEOs, as these CEOs already have weak influence over their CFOs and the marginal effect of 
further reducing their power is limited. The above analyses lead to the following hypotheses: 
H4A: The magnitude of discretionary accruals decreases in awardees’ firms. 
H4B: Award effects are weaker for firms with less powerful CEOs.  
3. Data Sources and Variable Construction 
3.1 CFO Awards and Sample Construction 
The core of my data is a hand-collected honoree list of the “America’s Best CFOs” award 
granted by Institutional Investor magazine between 2004 and 2012.8 The purpose of the award is 
to “identify and acknowledge the work of the most noteworthy financial executives.”9 Recipients 
are determined based on surveys that ask buy-side analysts, money managers, and sell-side 
researchers to name the best CFOs in their coverage universes. Though Institutional Investor does 
not provide formal criteria for the selection process, the organizer highlights that survey 
respondents vote for CFOs who “keep clean books and effectively communicate with the market 
about their companies’ performance” and who hold responsibility for improving operations and 
revenues.10 To ensure a fair result, Institutional Investor keeps confidential the identities of the 
survey respondents and has its own research operations group to review the votes. The magazine 
may also employ an independent auditor to inspect the final results. More detailed information 
about the awards is presented in Appendix 1. 
I choose this award for the following reasons. First, it is national in scope and open to any 
CFO in the United States. Second, it is granted by a prestigious organization and thus may affect 
the awardee’s subsequent status in the labor market. Moreover, the award honors the CFO 
excellence and thus is a suitable measure for a positive reputational shock to awardees.  
                                                            
8 In 2010, Institutional Investor magazine terminated the “America’s Best CFOs” list and published “The All-America 
Executive Team” list, which separates CEOs, CFOs and companies. My awardee list of CFOs from 2010 to 2012 is 
collected from the CFO category of “The All-America Executive Team” award.   
9 “The Best CFOs in America”, Institutional Investor, 2004, 
http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/1026650/the-best-cfos-in-america.html#.WOAgZFUrJtQ 
10 “America’s Best CFOs”, Institutional Investor, 2006, 
http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/1019611/americas-best-cfos.html#.WOAePFXyttQ 
My sample is constructed mainly relying on the ExecuComp database. I define the sample 
period as the time window between award month 2001 and award month 2014. From 2004 to 2012, 
the award month is defined as the month when the award is announced. For 2001, 2002 and 2003, 
when the award was not granted, the award month is set as February, which is, respectively, 36 
months, 24 months, and 12 months before the award month in 2004. For 2013 and 2014, the award 
month is set as January, which is 12 months and 24 months after the award month in 2012. I include 
in my sample ExecuComp CFOs whose firms have a fiscal year-end falling within the time 
window from February 2001 to January 2014.  
I hand-collect the list of “America’s Best CFOs” using press releases and the digital version 
of Institutional Investor magazine. Various analyses in this paper require detailed compensation 
data and individual attributes of CFOs. Therefore, I only include awardees who are covered in the 
ExecuComp database, filtering out those from small firms and private firms. For each individual 
on the awardee list, I manually search for his/her name in the ExecuComp database to obtain the 
ID number of the executive/company combination (co_per_rol). As a result, I obtain a list that 
consists of 697 awardees. Since I use discretionary accruals to measure earnings management, I 
require awardees’ firms included in the sample for main tests to have detailed information on the 
components of accruals reported in the Compustat database. Figure 1 illustrates by year the number 
of all awardees, ExecuComp awardees, and awardees whose company has accruals information 
available. The number of awardees varies from year to year because the award organization makes 
award decisions based on responses to surveys and requires award winners to garner a minimum 
number of votes. 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
In Figure 2, I report the number of awardees by the Fama-French 12 industries, split into 
ExecuComp awardees and awardees whose company has accruals information. Note that most 
awardees from financial firms are omitted from the accruals sample, the sample for the main tests 
that requires information to be available to construct the accruals variable.11  
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
The control group is constructed based on all the non-awardee CFOs covered by the 
ExecuComp universe during the sample period. For the post-2005 period, an ExecuComp 
executive is identified as a CFO if the CFOANN code provided by the database equals “CFO.” 
For the rest of the sample period when the CFOANN code is not provided, I identify CFOs using 
supplementary information from the ExecuComp “titleann” code, BoardEx database, and hand-
collected executive profiles from Bloomberg, Equilar, and proxy statements. Although 
ExecuComp provides the most data on individual attributes and compensation details, it misses 
data on CFO age for 29.6% of the observations in my sample. It also does not directly provide data 
on a CFO’s tenure. Part of the missing data is supplemented using BoardEx. I manually collect the 
rest from Bloomberg, Equilar, and proxy statements.12 Data on firm characteristics and stock 
performance are drawn from the CRSP/Compustat merged database. The board of directors and 
other corporate governance characteristics are obtained from BoardEx and RiskMetrics. In the 
main tests, I also require control firms to have detailed information on the components of accruals. 
This, again, rules out most financial firms from the final sample for main tests. I obtain data of 
non-reliance financial restatements from Audit Analytics for ExecuComp firms during my sample 
period. Audit Analytics also provides the disclosure date and the information on restatement 
                                                            
11 In untabulated robustness tests, I further restrict my sample to nonfinancial firms and my main results are robust. 
12 After filling in the missing data, 547 observations are still without information on age. 
categories (e.g., financial fraud, board’s involvement, material accounting, and clerical application 
errors). Data on analyst recommendations are obtained from the I/B/E/S Recommendations 
database. 
Starting from 2006, ExecuComp significantly changed its reporting in response to FAS 123R. 
One important adjustment is the method of estimating option grants. Instead of using the previous 
method based on Black-Scholes value, ExecuComp reports the fair value of option grants 
estimated by firms for the post-2005 period. To assure the computation of option grants and TDC1 
is comparable between the pre- and post-2005 period, I recalculate the two based on the 
methodology discussed in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2014). A detailed description of the 
recalculation procedure is reported in Appendix 3. 
Overall, my sample for the main tests consists of 13,465 CFO-year observations, including 
1,077 past-awardee observations, 899 future awardee observations, and 11,489 “never-win” 
observations. A past awardee in a given year is defined as a CFO who received the award before 
a given year. A future awardee in a given year is defined as a CFO who received the award in or 
after that year. A “never-win” CFO is defined as a sample CFO who did not receive an award 
during the sample period. Selected summary statistics for my sample are reported in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
It is clear from Panel A of Table 1 that past awardees and future awardees noticeably differ 
from the “never-win” group along many dimensions. Compared to “never-win” CFOs, past 
awardees and future awardees are older, are more likely to serve as an executive director in their 
own firm, and have substantially higher total compensation. In particular, past awardees and future 
awardees have considerably higher PPS than their counterparts. 13  In addition, discretionary 
accruals in awardees’ firms are substantially smaller in magnitude.14 These firms are also larger in 
size and have better accounting performance. I also capture significant differences when 
comparing past awardees and future awardees in Panel B. Firms of past awardees have lower level 
accruals management, less powerful CEOs, a larger size, and less cash volatility. Moreover, past 
awardees have higher PPS, earn higher total compensation, and are more likely to serve on the 
board of their own firm. Overall, Table 1 suggests that it is critical to consider individual attributes 
and firm characteristics in analyses to avoid results driven by selection bias. I consider various 
econometric approaches to address this issue. Details are provided in section 4.  
3.2 CEO PI 
In the spirit of previous literature (Adams et al., 2005; Feng et al., 2011; Heater, 2016), I 
construct a CEO power index (CEO PI) to measure CEO power over CFOs. The index consists of 
five factors that are likely to influence a CEO’s relative bargaining power: (1) relative age indicator 
equal to 1 if the CEO is not younger than the CFO and 0 otherwise,15 (2) relative number of titles, 
which is set as 1 if the CEO holds more Execucomp titles than the CFO for a given fiscal year, (3) 
relative directorship indicator equal to 1 if the CEO is an executive director but the CFO is not for 
a given fiscal year, (4) founder indicator equal to 1 if the CEO is a founder of the firm, and (5) 
relative stock computed as the difference between the CEO’s stock and the CFO’s stock divided 
by the sum of the two. The CEO PI is then defined as the sum of the five factors. Specifically, 
                                                            
13 The methodology for constructing PPS and CEO PI measures is described in sections 4.1.4 and 3.2, respectively. 
14 The methodology for estimating discretionary accruals is described in section 3.3. 
15 In the robustness tests, I replace the relative age indicator with a relative tenure indicator which is equal to 1 if the 
CEO’s tenure is longer than the CFO’s. My results are robust, as shown in TableA6. 
 
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑁𝑢𝑚. 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 , (1) 
3.3 Discretionary Accruals 
To estimate discretionary accruals, I first define total accruals. Following previous 
literature (e.g., Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005; Bergstresser and Phillipon, 2006), total 
accruals are defined as the disparity between earnings and cash flows from operations, scaled by 
lagged total assets. Specifically, total accruals is computed as: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = (∆𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 +  ∆𝐶𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖,𝑡)/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1, (2) 
for firm i in year t,  𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the total accruals, ∆𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡is the change in current assets (Compustat 
item 4), ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is the change in current liabilities (Compustat item 5),  ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is the change in 
cash (Compustat item 1), ∆𝐶𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the change in long-term debt in current liabilities (Compustat 
item 34), 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖,𝑡 is the depreciation expenses (Compustat item 14), and  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 is the lagged total 
assets (Compustat item 6). 
I use two approaches to estimate discretionary accruals. The first model (Model I), in the 
spirit of Kothari et al. (2005), includes 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 in the Jones (1991) regression when estimating 
normal accruals. Including 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 considers effects of accounting performance and thus may 
enhance the reliability of the estimation. Specifically, I run the following regression for each Fama-
French 48-industry group: 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐼:  
 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × (1/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1) +  𝛽2 × (∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ) +  𝛽2 × (𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ) + 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,   (3)  
where ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the change in sales (Compustat item 12) for firm i in year t and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the 
gross property and equipment (Compustat item 7). Both of the variables are scaled by lagged total 
assets. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is the lagged return on assets for firm i in year t. I estimate equation (3) on the 
entire Compustat sample back to 1976. This yields coefficients that can be applied to current 
observations to construct a measure of normal accruals, defined as the predicted value from the 
regression. Discretionary accruals is then defined as the difference between the total accruals and 
the estimated normal accruals:  
𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡
1 = 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑖,𝑡
1 ,    (4) 
where 𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡
1  and 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑖,𝑡
1  are, respectively, the estimated discretionary accruals and normal 
accruals computed using Model I. 
For robustness, I also employ the version of the original Jones (1991) model (Model II) 
where normal accruals are estimated as the predicted value from the following regression: 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐼𝐼:  
 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × (1/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2 × (∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ) +  𝛽2 × (𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , (5) 
where ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the change in sales for firm i in year t and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the gross property and 
equipment. Both of the variables are scaled by lagged total assets.  
The discretionary accruals is then identified as: 
𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡
2 = 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑖,𝑡
2 ,     (6) 
where 𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡
2  and 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑖,𝑡
2  are, respectively, the discretionary accruals and normal accruals 
computed using Model II. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Award Effects on CFO Career Opportunities and Bargaining Power 
4.1.1 Market Reaction to Award Announcements 
In section 4.1, I validate that the CFO awards have important effects on awardees’ job 
market status and relative bargaining power. Before examining my hypotheses, I study the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of awardee firms around the announcement of award events 
to confirm the eligibility of using the awards as positive shocks to award recipients. If the market 
cannot perfectly predict awardees, the announcement of the winner list will lead to a positive 
market reaction based on updated information about awardees and their firms. I employ various 
sources to obtain the announcement date of the award, including press releases, archived websites, 
and the digital version of the Institutional Investor magazine. The event date is set as the earliest 
date that the awardee list appears in any of these sources. Event dates on non-trading days are 
transferred to the next trading day. CARs are calculated using market adjusted returns with CRSP 
value-weighted index as the proxy for market returns. 𝛼 and 𝛽 are estimated using a 250-date 
period which ends 60 days before the event date. At least 60 days of return data is required for 
estimation.  
Results of the event study are presented in Table A4, Appendix 4. I report CARs of awardee 
firms for three event windows: (-3, +3), (-1, +1), and (0, 0), where day 0 denotes the event day. On 
average, the announcement of the award leads to a significant and positive market reaction to 
awardee firms in the event day, generating an abnormal return of 0.11%. For event windows (-3, 
+3) and (-1, +1), the average CAR is 0.46% and 0.23%, respectively, both significant at the 5% 
level. Overall, the results suggest that the announcement of awards conveys new information to 
the market, causing investors to positively re-evaluate awardee firms perhaps based on their beliefs 
that awardee firms can benefit from their CFOs’ ability and experience. 
4.1.2 Career Opportunities after Awards 
Next, I examine whether the CFO awards have significant effects on awardees’ career 
opportunities outside and inside the firm. I define external promotion as that a CFO experiences 
one of the following out comes: (1) gains a position with higher pay in another firm, (2) becomes 
a CEO in another firm, and (3) moves to a more prestigious firm. Given recent work by Masulis 
and Mobbs (2014) suggesting that directors devote more effort to directorships at relatively large 
firms, I measure firm prestige by market capitalization as of the beginning of the latest fiscal year 
before the award month. The internal promotion is defined as that the CFO is promoted to an 
executive director or a higher-ranked executive position inside the firm, including COO, president, 
and CEO. I label the calendar year in which an award occurs as year t. For each CFO, I identify 
his or her job-market status for which the fiscal year ends before the award month of year t and 
after the award month of year t-1. This job market status is designated as year t-1 status, which is 
the basis for my analysis in this section. The changes in internal and external job opportunities are 
measured from the base year (year t-1) to two years later (year t+1).  
Statistics from Table 1 suggest that awardees differ from non-awardees along many 
dimensions. In other words, it is highly possible that the treatment group is not being randomly 
assigned, suggesting that a simple difference-in-difference test using the full set of non-awardees 
as the control sample is not valid. I employ the propensity score matching approach proposed by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to match each awardee with multiple non-awardees with a similar 
propensity of winning the award. Specifically, I use a subsample from year 2004 to 2012 and 
estimate a logit regression to explore determinants of winning the award. The regression includes 
all of the 697 awardees and 12,255 non-awardees. Dependent variable in the logit regression is an 
indicator equal to 1 if a CFO receives an award in year t. Independent variables are individual 
attributes and firm characteristics which may simultaneously influence the probability of winning 
the award and subsequent career status, including firm size, industry adjusted ROA, industry 
adjusted stock returns, stock volatility, book-to-market ratio (BTM), sales growth, CFO 
compensation, tenure, age, executive director indicator, and board independence. I use the number 
of analysts who included the firm in their buy/sell recommendations in the past three years to 
partially measure a CFO’s visibility. Since the award is aimed at recognizing CFO excellence, I 
also include leverage which are highly related to corporate financial decisions (Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2010). Event year and industry dummies are included, too.  
Results of the logit regression are presented in Panel A of Table A5, Appendix 5. As 
expected, CFOs are more likely to win the award if they are from firms that are larger in size, have 
lower stock volatility, experience greater sales growth, or receive more analysts’ recommendation 
during the past three years. Individual characteristics also significantly affect the propensity of 
winning the award. Younger CFOs, CFOs with longer tenures, highly-paid CFOs, and CFOs 
serving as an executive director are more likely to receive the award. In an additional test, I also 
control for the magnitude of discretionary accruals in the regression and report the results in Panel 
C of Table A5, Appendix 5. I do not find significant effect of discretionary accruals on the 
likelihood of winning the award nor an improvement in the R-squared. To avoid a considerable 
shrink in the sample size, I exclude discretionary accruals from the matching process. 
I adopt a nearest-neighbor matching estimator with replacement to implement matching. 
Each awardee is matched with four non-awardees, leading to a matched sample of 639 awardees 
and 2,556 non-awardees (3,195 overall observations). 16  According to previous studies on 
                                                            
16 The number of awardees is slightly smaller after conducting the logit regression because some awardees or their 
firms do not have data for at least one control variable, making it impossible to calculate the propensity score for 
these awardees. 
propensity-score matching, more matches help to decrease variance in estimating treatment effects 
but also increase unbalance of covariates (Rubin and Thomas, 2000). I choose the 1-to-4 ratio 
instead of a regular 1-to-1 ratio because it makes the best balance between variance and bias. In 
untabulated robustness tests, I obtain similar results in awardee status analyses using 1-to-1, 1-to-
3 and 1-to-5 matching ratios. I conduct multiple tests to check the after-matching balance of 
covariates. Panel B of Table A5 presents the results of standardized-difference checking, t-tests 
and re-estimating the logit regression on the matched sample. All the covariates are well balanced 
after matching. In particular, though not controlling for discretionary accruals in the logit 
regression, this covariate has no significant difference between awardees and matched non-
awardees. 
I first compare overall outcomes for awardees and matched non-awardees on a univariate 
basis. Panel A of Table 2 reports the changes in the percentage of external and internal promotion 
from year t-1 to year t+1, categorized by awardees and matched non-awardees. Within the 2-year 
time window, 0.31% of awardees become the CEO of another firm, while 0.04% of their matched 
counterparts gain such an external position. In addition, 1.56% of awardees move to a higher-paid 
position and 1.56% to a larger firm, significantly higher than the proportion of non-awardees (0.78% 
and 0.70%). In all, 1.72% of awardees experience at least one type of external promotion within 
the time window, slightly more than the percentage of matched non-awardees (1.21%). But the 
difference is not statistically significant.  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
The external promotion is not able to illustrate the complete picture of awardees’ updated 
career status, because an awardee with potential outside offers does not have to move to another 
firm as long as his/her promotion opportunity and compensation in the current company increase 
to an equivalent level. Therefore, I also track internal promotion of award winners. Results in Panel 
A of Table 2 suggest a significantly higher chance for awardees to be promoted in their own firm. 
6.64% of awardees gain a board seat in their own firm from year t-1 to year t+1, 4.33% are 
promoted to COO, and 5.05% become a president. These proportions are substantially higher than 
those of matched non-awardees (1.37%, 0.12% and 0.32%, respectively).17 The percentage of 
promotion to CEO is 1.56% for awardees versus 0.63% of non-awardees. 12.05% of awardees 
experience at least one type of internal promotion from year t-1 to year t+1, significantly higher 
than the proportion of matched non-awardees (2.42%). The percentage of awardees experiencing 
either internal promotion or external promotion is 13.77%, whereas the percentage for non-
awardees is 3.64%. The difference is highly statistically significant (p-value < 1%). Overall, my 
results in Panel A support the view that awardees experience an improved status in the form of 
having more external and internal opportunities. 
Then I turn to multivariate regression analyses to more carefully examine the changes in 
external and internal promotion opportunities. I carry out logit analyses to examine the changes in 
the likelihood of internal/external promotion from year t-1 to year t+1. Although the propensity-
score matching procedure has significantly weakened the effects of firm and individual 
characteristics on predicting the award results, these variables may still have explanatory power 
on the subsequent status of CFOs. Therefore, I include all the matching-stage controls in the 
regressions. Panel B of Table 2 presents the results from the logit regressions explaining the 
likelihood of external promotion. Column (1) to (3) investigate the likelihood of gaining an 
external position with higher pay, moving to a larger firm, and experiencing any type of external 
                                                            
17 When investigating promotions to board director, COO, and president, I employ a subsample which only includes 
individuals who do not hold such position in year t-1. 
promotion, respectively. In each column, the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the 
CFO experiences the given outcome. In line with H1, coefficients on the awardee indicator are all 
significant and positive, suggesting that awardees face a substantial increase in outside career 
opportunities. Panel C presents the results of logit regressions explaining that a sample CFO 
experiences one of the following interfirm outcomes: (1) becomes an executive director, (2) 
becomes the COO and/or the president, (3) experiences internal promotion of any type, including 
CEO, COO, president, and executive director, and (4) experiences internal or external promotion 
of any type. Consistent with H2A, coefficients on the awardee indicator in Column (1) to (3) are 
all positive, significant at the 1% level. In addition, Column (4) suggests that, compared to their 
matched counterparts, awardees have noticeably higher chances of being promoted either inside 
or outside the firm. 
4.1.3 Changes in Compensation 
Results in 4.1.2 suggest that awardees are more favored candidates than their competitors 
in the CFO labor market and experience a substantial increase in external job opportunities. Since 
these “super star” CFOs own specialized human capital which is a critical resource for the 
company, current employers might be willing to provide not only promotion opportunities but also 
higher compensation to retain them. Besides, employers may also use restricted stock and options 
(“golden handcuffs”) to lock these awardees into the current position. Therefore, I expect a 
significant increase in the total compensation and stock and option grants for awardee CFOs who 
stay in the current firm (H2B). To examine this proposition, I estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions where the independent variables are the dollar value of the changes in total 
compensation, stock and option grants, and salary of sample CFOs, respectively. The changes are 
all measured from year t-1 to year t+1. These regressions are based on a subsample which only 
includes awardees and matched non-awardees who are retained in the current firm at year t+1.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
Table 3 reports the estimation results. As expected, results in Column (1) and (2) reveal a 
sizable increase in awardees’ total compensation and equity grants, both significant at 1% level. 
Awardees, on average, experience an increase of $798,132 in their total compensation from year 
t-1 to year t+1, including a $430,441 increase in stock and option grants. Column (3) shows that 
the increase in salary ($18,080), though statistically significant, is much smaller in magnitude than 
stock and option grants and total compensation. These findings are in line with the implication of 
H2B that firms tend to provide a higher compensation for awardees, and the increase in 
compensation is mainly attributed to the increase in stock and option grants. One may argue that 
the increase in equity grants indeed impairs an awardee’s bargaining power since he/she would no 
longer be a credible threat to leave. To address this concern, I also examine the changes in an 
awardee’s compensation package when he/she moves to a new firm. Untabulated tests show that 
awardees, when joining a new firm, receive significantly higher total compensation and initial 
hiring grants than matched counterparts. This suggests that awardees who leave the current firm 
would not worry too much about forfeiting equity holdings since they can be compensated by the 
compensation package provided by the new employers. 
4.1.4 Changes in CEO Power 
Since awardee CFOs experience a substantial increase in internal and external career 
opportunities, they become less concerned about losing their current jobs and gain the ability to 
withhold their human capital, leading to an increase in their bargaining power. To examine this 
proposition, I estimate fixed effect models on the full sample which includes all the S&P 1500 
CFOs with available data between 2002 and 2014. Propensity-score matching approach fits better 
when explaining a nonlinear relationship between the probability and the log odds. It also helps to 
reduce possible estimation bias when the number of observations is very small relative to the full 
sample. Therefore, it is proper to use this approach when investigating the changes in promotion 
likelihood. However, it also brings the concern that unobservable firm characteristics may drive 
both the likelihood of winning the award and the subsequent changes in awardees’ status. In 
contrast, the use of a fixed effect model enables to control for time-invariant unobservable firm 
characteristics. Therefore, I estimate the following regression: 
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1𝛾 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , (7) 
where 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 is the CEO power index of firm i in year t; 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 indicates a three-year 
time window after the incumbent CFO of company i receives the award for the first time; 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 is 
the vector of firm and individual controls for which the fiscal year-end falls within the time window 
between the award month of year t-1 and the award month of year t; 𝜂𝑡 are year fixed effects, and 
𝜂𝑖 are firm fixed effects.  
To further capture the changes in the CEO power index over time, I also estimate the 
following regression: 
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝜏
1𝑃𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡−𝜏
2
𝜏=1
+ 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + ∑ 𝛽𝜏
2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡+𝜏
3
𝜏=1
+ 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1𝛾 + 𝜂𝑡 
+𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , (8) 
where 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 is the CEO power index of firm i in year t; 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡−𝜏 indicates year 𝜏 before 
the incumbent CFO of company i receives the award for the first time; 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 indicates the 
year when the incumbent CFO of company i is granted the award for the first time; 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡+𝜏 
indicates year 𝜏 after the incumbent CFO of company i receives the award for the first time; 
𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 is the vector of firm and individual characteristics for which the fiscal year-end falls within 
the time window between the award month of year t-1 and the award month of year t; 𝜂𝑡 are year 
fixed effects, and 𝜂𝑖 are firm fixed effects.  
 [Insert Table 4 Here] 
Results of estimating the two regressions are reported in Panel A of Table 4. The coefficient 
on the post-award indicator in Column (1) suggests that, on average, CEO power index in awardee 
firms is 0.11 lower than their counterparts during the three-year window after the award. 
Consistent with the findings in Column (1), Column (2) indicates that the CEO power index in 
awardee firms, on average, is 0.09, 0.13, and 0.15 lower than their counterparts in the first, second, 
and third year after the award, respectively. These results are in line with the proposition that 
awardees face lower CEO power after receiving the award (H3). 
Previous literature suggests that earnings management is associated with CFO equity 
incentives (Jiang et al., 2010; Chava and Purnanaham, 2010). Since CEO power and CFO equity 
incentives can be endogenous, I also track the changes in CFO equity incentives surrounding 
awards and control for it in later analyses. Results in section 4.1.3 suggest that awardee CFOs 
receive noticeably more stock and options grants after the award. Therefore, I expect a rise in 
awardees’ equity incentives. I calculate delta, the dollar change in wealth associated with a 1% 
change in the firm’s stock price, based on the methodology in Core and Guay (2002) and Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen (2006). Following Bergstresser and Phillipon (2006), I compute the incentive 
ratio to measure pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS): 
𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡/ (𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ),    (9) 
Then I estimate the following regressions to examine the award effects on CFO PPS: 
𝐶𝐹𝑂 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1𝛾 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (10) 
where 𝐶𝐹𝑂 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the CFO pay-for-performance sensitivity of firm i in year t; 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 
indicates a three-year time window after the incumbent CFO of company i receives the award for 
the first time; 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 is the vector of firm and individual attributes for which the fiscal year-end falls 
within the time window between the award month of year t-1 and the award month of year t; 𝜂𝑡 are 
year fixed effects, and 𝜂𝑖 are firm fixed effects.  
𝐶𝐹𝑂 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝜏
1𝑃𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡−𝜏
2
𝜏=1
+ 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + ∑ 𝛽
𝜏
2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡+𝜏
3
𝜏=1
+ 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1𝛾 + 𝜂𝑡 
+𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , (11) 
where 𝐶𝐹𝑂 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  is the CFO pay-for-performance sensitivity of firm i in year t; 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡−𝜏 
indicates year 𝜏 before the incumbent CFO of company i receives the award for the first time; 
𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 indicates the year when the incumbent CFO of company i is granted the award for the 
first time; 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡+𝜏  indicates year 𝜏 after the incumbent CFO of company i receives the 
award for the first time; 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 is the vector of firm and individual attributes for which the fiscal 
year-end falls within the time window between the award month of year t-1 and the award month 
of year t; 𝜂𝑡 are year fixed effects, and 𝜂𝑖 are firm fixed effects.  
Panel B of Table 4 presents the results. Column (1) in Panel B shows that, on average, a 
1% change in the firm’s stock price will increase an awardees’ wealth $30,500 more than their 
counterparts during the three-year window after awards. Coefficients in Column (2) are consistent 
with the findings in Column (1), though the significant increase in delta starts in the second year 
after the award, suggesting a delay of the award effect. Similarly, Column (3) and (4) show that 
awardees have a substantially larger PPS (0.02) three years after awards, and the significant 
increase starts in year 3. Overall, the results suggest a significant increase in awardees’ equity 
incentives after the award. 18  Since winning the award affects CEO power and CFO equity 
incentives in opposite directions, it yields clean tests to differentiate the effects of the two on 
earnings management.  
4.2 Award Effects on Earnings Management 
4.2.1 Discretionary Accruals and CFO Awards 
In this section, I examine how the shift in bargaining power between CEOs and CFOs 
affects financial reporting quality. Following prior studies (e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; 
Jiang et al., 2010), I use the absolute value of discretionary accruals to measure the magnitude of 
earnings management. If the balance of power between the CEO and CFO matters for financial 
reporting quality, a lower level of discretionary accruals will be found in awardees’ firms. I again 
use the panel data from year 2002 to 2014 and estimate the following fixed effect models: 
|𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡| = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1𝛾 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (12)  
where |𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡| is the absolute value of discretionary accruals of firm i in year t; 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 
indicates a three-year time window after the incumbent CFO of company i receives the award for 
the first time; 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 is the vector of firm and individual characteristics for which the fiscal year-
end falls within the time window between the award month of year t-1 and the award month of 
year t; 𝜂𝑡 are year fixed effects, and 𝜂𝑖 are firm fixed effects.  
|𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡| = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝜏
1𝑃𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡−𝜏
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18 Johnson, Ryan, and Tian (2009) suggests that unrestricted stocks and options provide stronger incentives for 
managers to commit fraud than restricted equities. For robustness, I also construct alternative delta and PPS based 
on unrestricted stocks and options. The results are consistent, as reported in Table A6 in Appendix 6. 
where |𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡| is the absolute value of discretionary accruals of firm i in year t; 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡−𝜏 
indicates year 𝜏 before the incumbent CFO of company i receives the award for the first time; 
𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 indicates the year when the incumbent CFO of company i is granted the award for the 
first time; 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡+𝜏  indicates year 𝜏 after the incumbent CFO of company i receives the 
award for the first time;  𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 is the vector of firm and individual characteristics for which the 
fiscal year-end falls within the time window between the award month of year t-1 and the award 
month of year t; 𝜂𝑡 are year fixed effects, and 𝜂𝑖 are firm fixed effects.  
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
Panel A of Table 5 reports the results. The dependent variable in Column (1) and (2) is the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using Model I (|DA1|). The coefficient on the 
post-award indicator in Column (1) shows that awardee firms have, on average, 47 basis points 
less in discretionary accruals relative to both non-awardees and pre-award periods, significant at 
the 1% level. Column (2) tracks the magnitude of discretionary accruals over time. Before and in 
the award year, I find no significant difference in discretionary accruals between awardee firms 
and their counterparts. In contrast, awardee firms have a noticeably lower level of discretionary 
accruals (69 basis points) than non-awardees and pre-award period in the first year after the award. 
The difference increases to 72 basis points in the second year, significant at the 1% level. Awardee 
firms still have significantly smaller accruals in the third year, though the difference drops to 39 
basis points. For robustness, I estimate discretionary accruals using Model II (|DA2|) and find 
similar results as shown in Column (3) and (4). The coefficient on the post-award indicator in 
Column (3) is significantly negative and the magnitude is similar to that in Column (1). In line 
with Column (2), Column (4) indicates that awardee firms hold a significantly lower level of 
discretionary accruals in each of the three years after awards, while there is no significant 
difference between the two groups before and in the award year. Overall, the results suggest a 
considerably lower level of accruals management in awardee firms than both non-awardees and 
pre-award period.  
Because the absolute value of discretionary accruals cannot completely capture the changes 
in accruals management, I also investigate signed discretionary accruals in my main tests. In Panel 
B of Table 5, I replace the dependent variable with signed accruals. Column (1) suggests that 
winning the award significantly reduces signed accruals (DA1) by 37 basis points, while Column 
(2) shows that the negative effect of winning the award is significant only in the first two years 
after the award. Column (3) and Column (4) employ DA2 and find similar results. The slightly 
weaker award effects on signed accruals are perhaps due to the opposite effects of the award on 
positive accruals and negative accruals (i.e., a negative effect on positive accruals and a positive 
effect on negative accruals). Therefore, I further divide the sample into positive and negative 
accruals and report the results in Panel C and Panel D. I find that winning the award has a 
significant and negative effect on positive abnormal accruals as shown in Panel C. The coefficient 
on the post-award indicator in Column (1) is significantly negative and large in magnitude (53 
basis points, significant at the 1% level). Results in Column (2) suggest the negative effect of the 
award is significant for the award year and each year in the first three years after the first award. 
Replacing DA1+ with DA2+ generates similar results as shown in Column (3) and (4), except for 
that the award effect is weak for the second year after the award (t=1.526). Panel D employs only 
negative accruals and provides weak evidence that winning the award has a positive effect on 
negative discretionary accruals. In Column (1) and Column (2) where the dependent variable is 
DA1-, the coefficients on the post-award indicators are positive but insignificant. After replacing 
DA1- with DA2-, the positive coefficient becomes significant for the post-award indicator and the 
indicator for the second and third year after the award. Overall, results in Panel B, Panel C, and 
Panel D are consistent with Panel A, suggesting that winning the award has a significant effect on 
smoothing discretionary accruals in awardees’ firms. In addition, the negative effect on positive 
accruals is more significant than the positive effect on negative accruals. This finding is in line 
with survey evidence and Friedman’s model where powerful CEOs are more likely to push 
earnings upward. 
4.2.2 CEO-Power Subsample Comparison 
If the decrease in the CEO’s relative bargaining power is the main channel of the reduction 
in discretionary accruals, one would expect a difference between firms with different levels of 
CEO bargaining power. While the CFO award is expected to significantly affect firms with 
powerful CEOs, it might have limited marginal effects on earnings management in firms with less 
powerful CEOs as these CEOs already have weak influence over their CFOs. Therefore, I dived 
the full sample into two subsamples based on lagged CEO PI to further confirm that the balance 
of power between CEOs and CFOs is the main channel.  
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
Panel A of Table 6 presents the results. Column (1) employs a subsample where the lagged 
CEO PI is above the median. The results indicate that awardee firms hold significantly less 
discretionary accruals than their counterparties (58 basis points). In contrast, the coefficient in the 
low CEO PI group (CEO PI is below the median) is statistically insignificant and 1.8 times smaller 
than that in the high CEO PI group. To further check whether the award has different effects in the 
two different subsamples, I conduct a new test where the dependent variable is the changes in the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals (∆|DA1|) from three years ago to the year of interest. As shown 
in Panel B of Table 6, there is a notable difference in the award effects on ∆|DA1| between the two 
CEO power groups. While the high CEO power group exhibits a significant negative award effect 
on reducing accruals (82 basis points), there is no significant difference between awardee firms 
and their counterparts in the low CEO PI group. In all, my results in 4.2.2 are in line with H4B and 
provide support for the argument that the smaller magnitude of accruals in awardee firms is due to 
the decrease in CEO power over the CFO.  
4.2.3 Instrumental Variable Estimation 
Employing CFO awards to measure exogenous shocks to awardee status mitigates the 
concern that there is a loop of causality between post-award accruals management and the 
probability of winning the award. However, it is still possible that some uncontrolled firm and 
individual characteristics cause both of them. To adjust for the potential endogeneity, I treat the 
post-award indicator as endogenous and conduct 2SLS regressions. Specifically, I use the number 
of analysts who include a CFO’s company in their buy/sell recommendations within the past five 
years to instrument the CFO’s likelihood of being in the three-year window after awards. I use the 
lagged two-year number of analysts to generate a relatively long time gap between 
recommendations and the year of interest.  According to the award organizer, the award results are 
based on surveys that ask both the buy-side and sell-side professionals to nominate candidates in 
their coverage universes. My instrument is relevant because it partially measures the number of 
analysts who know a company and its executives. After all, a CFO who is known by very few 
investment professionals is hardly to be nominated in the first place. On the other hand, being 
mentioned by more analysts does not necessarily mean a better performance since analysts have 
different opinions and different focuses. Besides, the number of recommendations is added up in 
a relatively long period (5 years) during which analysts’ opinions can vary. More importantly, 
these recommendations represent analysts’ points of view three to seven years ago. It is arguable 
that being mentioned by analysts a few years ago is hardly to have strong predictive power on a 
firm’s current accruals management. In other words, the instrument affects the second-stage 
dependent variable only through its effects on the endogenous variable. I obtain all the analyst 
recommendations between 1995 and 2013 from I/B/E/S Recommendations database and merge 
the data with sample firms. In all, 9,298 firm-year observations in the main-test sample have at 
least one analyst recommendation within the lagged five-year window. 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
Table 7 presents results from estimating the 2SLS model. Column (1) shows estimates 
from the OLS regression that predicts the Post Award indicator. As expected, the coefficient on 
the instrument is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the IV is highly relevant 
to the endogenous variable. Column (2) and (3) report the results from the second-stage. In Column 
(2), the predicted likelihood of being in a post-award period has a negative effect on the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals (|DA1|), significant at the 10% level. Column (3) shows similar 
results when replacing |DA1| with |DA2|. Overall, the findings from the 2SLS regressions confirm 
the main results in Table 5 that awardee firms have a significantly smaller magnitude of 
discretionary accruals. 
4.2.4 Pre-Award Period and CFO Moving 
A natural question concerns whether award winners would have kept a small magnitude of 
discretionary accruals even without receiving the award. Though previous tests which track the 
over-time changes in accruals management help to address this concern, I further confirm my 
results by separately examining the effects of having a past-awardee CFO in the firm versus having 
a future awardee19. I first employs a subsample which only includes CFOs who have already 
received the award (past awardees) and CFOs who never win the award during the sample period 
(“never-win” CFOs). The results reported in Column (1) of Table 8 indicate that firms of past 
awardees have 57 basis points less in |DA1| than “never-win” CFOs. Next, I turn to a subsample 
which only includes future awardees and “never-win” CFOs. As shown in Column, although the 
coefficient on the future-awardee indicator has a negative sign, it is insignificant both 
economically and statistically. This result suggests no significant difference in the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals between future awardees and “never-win” CFOs. This robustness check 
supports that my results are not due to awardee’s time-invariant style in accruals management.  
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
Next, I use two subsample tests to investigate the effect of an awardee’s departure and the 
effect of hiring a past awardee on a firm’s accruals management. The first subsample includes 
firms that have a past awardee CFO who leaves the firm during the sample period. Because 
successors generally have less job-market opportunities than their awardee predecessors, they are 
expected to have smaller bargaining power and are more likely to succumb the pressure from their 
CEOs to engage earnings management. Results in Column (3) provides weak evidence for this 
argument. The coefficient on the awardee-leaving indicator is positive and fairly large in 
magnitude, though it is statistically insignificant. The other subsample includes firms that hire an 
awardee during the sample period. As job market super stars, awardees are likely to have larger 
bargaining power than their predecessors in the new firm and are expected to keep a lower level 
                                                            
19 A past awardee and a future awardee are defined as described in section 3.1. 
of abnormal accruals. Results in Column (4) are consistent with this prediction. After hiring a past 
awardee, firms hold 78 basis points less accruals than before, significant at the 5% level.  
4.2.5 Financial Restatements  
Jiang et al. (2010) find no evidence that CFO incentives are associated with discretionary 
accruals for the post-SOX period. One possibility is that SOX might have changed earnings 
management behavior. For instance, the market may penalize revealed earnings management more 
severely if it is engaged by CFOs with high level PPS. The board of directors may also audit 
financial reports more intensively if the CFO has high equity incentives. This may drive CFOs 
with high equity incentives to voluntarily reduce the magnitude of abnormal accruals. Since my 
sample mainly covers the post-SOX period, it is possible that awardees, whose PPS sharply 
increases, intentionally reduce accruals management to avoid being punished. To mitigate the 
concern, I first investigate how the market reacts to non-reliance earnings restatements by sample 
companies. I focus on the post-SOX period (2003 to 2014) and include sample firms of which the 
fiscal year end locates in this time window. I obtain 1,235 non-reliance financial restatements from 
Audit Analytics for these firms. I use the disclosure date (file date) provided by Audit Analytics 
as the event date. All event dates on non-trading dates are treated as occurring on the next trading 
day. To calculate CARs, I use market adjusted returns and employ the CRSP value-weighted index 
as a proxy for market returns. Normal returns are computed over a 250-day estimation window 
ending 60 days prior to the event date. At least 60 days of return data is required for estimation. 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
Table 9 reports the results, split into past awardees firms and non-awardee firms (including 
both future awardees and “never win” CFOs). Column (1) and Column (2) suggest that the market 
negatively reacts to restatements issued by both awardee firms and their counterparts. However, 
the negative reactions are noticeably smaller for awardee firms. The average CAR for event 
windows (-3, +3), (-2, +2) and (-2, +1) is, respectively, -0.40%, -0.57% and -0.24% for awardees. 
In contrast, the average CAR for non-awardee firms is -1.02%, -1.03%, and -1.15% for the three 
event windows, respectively. These results perhaps reflect that the market views restatements of 
awardee firms less likely to be fraud related because of awardees’ reputation as high-quality CFOs. 
After all, the market does not know whether an earnings restatement is fraud related or not at the 
moment of the announcement and has to assess the detriment of the restatement based on current 
information. Furthermore, the market may also expect that awardees concern less about disclosing 
previous mistakes and restate frequently since their bargaining power considerably increases. 
Next, I examine whether awardees are audited more intensively by their firms after winning 
the award. I use the number of restatements in a given year to measure the intensity of auditing 
and estimate the following fixed effect model: 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1𝛾 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , (11) 
where 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the number of non-reliance restatements of firm i in year t; 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 indicates 
a three-year time window after the incumbent CFO of firm i receives the award for the first time; 
𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 is the vector of firm characteristics for which the fiscal year-end falls within the time window 
between the award month of year t-1 and the award month of year t; 𝜂𝑡 are year fixed effects, and 
𝜂𝑖 are firm fixed effects.  
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
Table 10 reports the results. Dependent variable in model (1) to (3) is, respectively, the 
number of non-reliance restatements, the number of restatements due to errors made by the current 
CFO, and the number of restatements due to errors made by predecessors. Following previous 
work (e.g., Doyle, Ge, and McVay, 2007; Guo, Hunag, Zhang and Zhou, 2016), I control for a 
vector of firm characteristics which reflect the firm’s economic position and governance quality. 
I include firm size, firm experience (measured by the logarithm of firm age), complexity (measured 
by the logarithm of the number of business segments), and board independence. To address the 
influence of firm performance and growth, I also control for accounting and stock performance, 
BTM, sales growth, an indicator for negative income before extraordinary items (IBE), and an 
indicator for acquisition activities. I construct an indicator for firm restructuring because a firm’s 
existing control system may not be sufficiently adjusted to match the new organizational structure. 
Besides, I control for the changes in accounts receivable and the changes in inventory, two tools 
firms might use to inflate sales growth and gross margin. 
Results in Column (1) indicate that awardee firms, on average, have fewer restatements 
than their counterparts after the award, significant at 10%. Since restatements could only be 
observed when errors have been made in previous financial reports, this result may imply that past 
awardees make fewer errors instead of that they are less intensively audited. To address this 
concern, I separate restatements that are due to mistakes made by the current CFO and their 
predecessors. If the results in Column (1) are mainly due to the high quality of financial reporting 
provided by awardees, one would observe awardee firms restate less when the error was made by 
the current CFO. On the other hand, one would not expect a significant difference between 
awardees and non-awardees when the mistake was made by predecessors. As shown in Column 
(2), the coefficient on the post-award indicator is negative but statistically insignificant when the 
errors are made by the current CFO. In contrast, awardee firms restate less when the errors are 
made by predecessors as shown in Column (3). Overall, the results in this section suggest no 
evidence that awardee firms are more intensively audited during the post-award period. A possible 
reason is that the audit committee in awardee firms is confident with the role played by their CFOs 
in overseeing current and past financial reporting, offsetting the concern on the increase in 
awardees’ equity incentives. 
4.2.6 Other Robustness Tests 
For robustness, I replace the full sample with a matched sample and replicate the main tests 
in Table 5. Specifically, I implement the PSM approach as described in sector 4.1.2. This process 
generates a matched sample of 639 awardees and 2,556 non-awardees. As a next step, I exclude 
CFOs whose company has no accruals information available and draw yearly data on firm and 
individual attributes for each of the rest CFOs in the matched sample. Doing so generates a panel 
which consists of 4,287 CFO-year observations. I replicate Panel A to Panel D in Table 5 using 
the matched sample and report the results in Table A8 in Appendix 8. Similar to pervious findings, 
Panel A and Panel C in Table A8 show that the award has a negative effect on the absolute accruals 
and positive accruals, both statistically and economically significant. In addition, Panel D shows 
a positive effect on negative accruals which is less significant but large in magnitude. However, I 
do not find significant effect of the award on signed accruals, as shown in Panel B. This is perhaps 
because the negative effect on positive accruals is noised by the positive effect on negative accruals. 
Nevertheless, the results support for the argument that winning the award helps reduce the 
magnitude of earnings management.  
5. Conclusion 
To conclude, my study provides new evidence on how the balance of power between CEOs 
and CFOs affects earnings management. I employ a unique dataset of the “Best American CFOs” 
awards to measure exogenous shocks to CFO job-market status. I document that awardees face a 
significant increase in career opportunities inside and outside the firm, and experience a substantial 
decrease in CEO power over them. Consistent with the view that the shifts in power between CEOs 
and CFOs reduce earnings management, I find that awardee firms have significantly smaller 
magnitude of discretionary accruals, relative to both non-awardee firms and pre-award periods. 
The award effects are only significant when the CEO is powerful. I find no evidence that these 
results are driven by awardees being more intensively audited by their firms. 
My study contributes to understanding causes of earnings management and has important 
implications for corporate governance reforms. Researchers and regulators have generally 
expressed the view that restricting CFO equity incentives may contribute to financial reporting 
quality. The SEC, for instance, amended disclosure requirements on CFO compensation after SOX. 
In contrast, my study provides evidence that balancing the power between CEOs and CFOs could 
also help reduce earnings management. Firms may benefit from providing more support for the 
CFO’s independence and balancing the CEO’s power in decisions regarding subordinates’ hiring, 
compensation, and turnover.  
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Figure 1 
Number of Awardees by Year 
This figure displays the number of recipients of “the America’s Best CFO” award from 2004 to 2012. 
“Awardees - All” is the number of all awardees. “Awardee - ExecuComp” is the number of awardees who 
are covered in ExecuComp. “Awardee - Accruals” is the number of awardees whose company has accruals 
information available in Compustat. 
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Figure 2 
Number of Awardees by Industry 
This graph presents the number of awardees by industry. The 12 industries are classified using the Fama-
French classification scheme. “BusEq” represents the business equipment industry. “Chems” is the 
chemical industry. “Durbl” is the consumer durables industry, including cars, TV's, furniture, and 
household appliances. “Energy” is the energy industry, including oils, gas, and coal extraction and products. 
“Finance” is the financial industry. “Hlth” includes healthcare, medical equipment, and drugs. “Manuf” is 
the manufacturing industry. “NoDur” is the consumer non-durables industry, including food, tobacco, 
textiles, apparel, leather, and toys. “Other” includes mines, construction, construction materials, 
transportation, hotels, business service, and entertainment. “Shops” includes wholesale, retail, and some 
services (e.g., laundries and repair shops). “Telcm” includes telephone and television transmission. “Utils” 
is the utilities industry. “Awardees - All” is the number of all awardees. “Awardee - ExecuComp” is the 
number of awardees who are covered in ExecuComp. “Awardee - Accruals” is the number of awardees 
whose company has accruals information available in Compustat. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 
This table provides selected summary statistics. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for two groups of CFOs: CFOs who win the award at least once 
(past awardees and future awardees) and CFOs who never win the award during the sample period. The sample includes S&P 1500 CFOs who are 
covered in the ExecuComp database and whose company has accruals and other data available. Panel B focuses on a subsample of CFOs who win 
the award at least once during the sample period, split into past awardees and future awardees. Accounting variables, except for Firm Size and BTM, 
are estimated as of the end of the fiscal year preceding an award month. Firm Size and BTM are measured as of the beginning of the fiscal year. All 
the variables are defined as described in Appendix 2. P values are reported in parentheses. 
 
Panel A. Past Awardees and Future Awardees versus “Never-Win” CFOs 
 Past Awardee & Future Awardee  Never Win 
 
Difference 
 Mean S.D. P1 Med. P99 N 
 
Mean S.D. P1 Med. P99 N 
 
DA1 0.038 0.037 0.001 0.032 0.162 1,976  0.050 0.053 0.001 0.038 0.247 11,489  -0.011(<0.01) 
DA2 0.034 0.036 0.001 0.026 0.162 1,976  0.046 0.053 0.001 0.033 0.247 11,489   -0.012(<0.01) 
CFO PPS 0.204 0.152 0.000 0.170 0.691 1,976  0.096 0.097 0.000 0.068 0.468 11,489  0.109 (<0.01) 
CEO PPS 0.361 0.231 0.014 0.318 1 1,976  0.235 0.216 0.000 0.165 0.971 11,489  0.125 (<0.01) 
CEO PI 3.168 0.847 0.932 3.488 4.968 1,976  3.139 0.888 0.721 3.383 4.979 11,489  0.033 (0.131) 
CFO TDC1 ($000) 4,051 4,103 386 3,075 19,133 1,976  1,438 1,508 180 1,035 7,086 11,489  2,627(<0.01) 
CFO Age 51 6.002 38 51 64 1,976  50 6.483 36 50 64 11,489  1.047 (<0.01) 
CFO Tenure 8 4.797 2 7 24 1,976  7 4.879 1 6 24 11,489  0.889(<0.01) 
Exe. Director 0.158 0.365 0 0 1 1,976  0.071 0.256 0 0 1 11,489  0.091 (<0.01) 
Firm Size 9.405 1.336 6.139 9.389 12.286 1,976  7.048 1.441 3.598 6.969 10.664 11,489  2.363 (<0.01) 
Indu.  Adj. ROA  0.061 0.114 -0.190 0.039 0.443 1,976  0.008 0.157 -0.570 0.014 0.396 11,489   0.052 (<0.01) 
Indu. Adj. Stock 
Return 
0.076 0.279 -0.570 0.086 0.714 1,976  0.075 0.287 -0.588 0.095 0.746 11,489  0.002 (0.77) 
BTM 0.364 0.289 -0.065 0.303 1.238 1,976  0.539 0.628 -0.403 0.466 2.363 11,489  -0.176 (<0.01) 
Table 1, Continued                
Cash Vol. 3yr 0.023 0.023 0.001 0.017 0.108 1,976  0.036 0.043 0.002 0.025 0.201 11,489  -0.013 (<0.01) 
Sales growth 0.109 0.220 -0.365 0.081 0.915 1,976   0.090 0.386 -0.525 0.062 1.009 11,489  0.019 (0.032) 
Leverage 0.230 0.171 0.000 0.213 0.689 1,976  0.212 0.210 0.000 0.191 0.802 11,489  0.020 (<0.01) 
CEO is Chair 0.715 0.452 0 1 1 1,976  0.592 0.492 0 1 1 11,489  0.121 (<0.01) 
 
  
Table 1, Continued 
Panel B. Past Awardees versus Future Awardees 
 Past Awardee  Future Awardee 
 
Difference 
 Mean S.D. P1 Med. P99 N 
 
Mean S.D. P1 Med. P99 N 
 
DA1 0.037 0.037 0.000 0.031 0.159 1,077  0.040 0.037 0.001 0.035 0.194 899  -0.004 (0.03) 
DA2 0.031 0.035 0.001 0.023 0.152 1,077  0.037 0.036 0.001 0.029 0.203 899  -0.005 (<0.01) 
CFO PPS 0.237 0.161 0.000 0.207 0.741 1,077  0.164 0.129 0.000 0.136 0.581 899  0.073 (<0.01) 
CEO PPS 0.376 0.220 0.023 0.346 0.978 1,077  0.342 0.242 0.000 0.275 1.000 899  0.034 (<0.01) 
CEO PI 3.064 0.866 0.822 3.382 4.962 1,077  3.293 0.807 1.013 3.579 4.979 899  -0.229 (<0.01) 
CFO TDC1 ($000) 4,690 4,318 395 3,646 23,170 1,077  3,286 3,688 327 2,432 16,725 899  1,404 (<0.01) 
CFO Age 53 5.631 40 53 65 1,077  49 5.813 37 49 61 899  3.692 (<0.01) 
CFO Tenure 10 4.734 2 9 25 1,077  6 4.235 1 5 22 899  3.265 (<0.01) 
Exe. Director 0.204 0.403 0 0 1 1,077  0.102 0.303 0 0 1 899  0.102 (<0.01) 
Firm Size 9.655 1.214 7.032 9.657 12.286 1,077  9.106 1.411 5.609 9.002 12.431 899  0.549 (<0.01) 
Indu  Adj. ROA  0.063 0.113 -0.160 0.036 0.440 1,077  0.059 0.116 -0.220 0.041 0.444 899  0.004 (0.43) 
Indu  Adj. Stock 
Return 
0.068 0.265 -0.561 0.095 0.671 1,077  0.085 0.296 -0.594 0.076 0.795 899  -0.018 (0.17) 
BTM 0.373 0.258 -0.017 0.317 1.254 1,077  0.353 0.322 -0.166 0.287 1.172 899  0.020 (0.14) 
Cash Vol. 3yr 0.021 0.018 0.001 0.015 0.097 1,077  0.027 0.027 0.001 0.019 0.122 899  -0.006 (<0.01) 
Sales growth 0.090 0.187 -0.338 0.071 0.722 1,077  0.133 0.253 -0.439 0.092 1.155 899  -0.043 (<0.01) 
Leverage 0.233 0.167 0.000 0.208 0.713 1,077  0.228 0.175 0.000 0.216 0.683 899  0.005 (0.539) 
CEO is Chair 0.712 0.453 0 1 1 1,077  0.717 0.450 0 1 1 899  -0.005 (0.80) 
Table 2 
External Promotion and Internal Promotion after CFO Awards 
The sample consists of 639 awardees and 2,556 propensity-score-matched non-awardees, identified 
as described in the text. Panel A tracks the ex post external/internal promotion of awardees and 
non-awardees within a two-year interval (year t−1, year t+1), where year t−1 is the latest fiscal year 
prior to the award announcement and year t+1 is the latest fiscal year prior to the 2nd anniversary 
of the award. Analysis of internal promotion to a certain position employs a subsample which only 
includes individuals who do not hold such a position in year t-1. Panel B reports the results of logit 
regressions explaining the likelihood that a CFO experiences one of the following outcomes in the 
external labor market from year t-1 to year t+1: (1) moves to a position with higher total 
compensation in another firm; (2) moves to a larger firm; and (3) experiences an external promotion 
of any type. Panel C reports the results of logit regressions explaining the likelihood that a CFO 
experiences one of the following interfirm outcomes from year t-1 to year t+1: (1) becomes an 
executive director of the firm; (2) becomes the COO and/or president of the firm; (3) experiences 
an internal promotion of any type; and (4) experiences a promotion (internal or external) of any 
type. Awardee is an indicator equal to 1 if the CFO receives the award at year t. Other variables are 
defined as described in Appendix 2. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent 
level. All multivariate regressions include indicators for event years and Fama French 48 industries 
(not reported). Values of z-statistics are reported in parentheses, and are based on robust standard 
errors. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis      
  
Awardees  
Matched  
Non-Awardees 
Difference  
  
N Mean  N Mean 
External Promotion        
Promoted to CEO in another firm  639 0.31%  2,556 0.04% 0.27%**  
Moving to a higher-paid position  639 1.56%  2,556 0.78% 0.78%*  
Moving to a larger firm  639 1.56%  2,556 0.70% 0.86% ** 
External promotion - Any  639 1.72%  2,556 1.21% 0.51%  
Internal Promotion        
Promoted to CEO  639 1.56%  2,556 0.63% 0.94% ** 
Promoted to executive director  527 6.64%  2,124 1.37% 5.28% *** 
Promoted to COO  623 4.33%  2,540 0.12% 4.22% *** 
Promoted to president  614 5.05%  2,533 0.32% 4.73% *** 
Internal promotion - Any  639 12.05%  2,556 2.42% 9.62% *** 
Internal/External Promotion 
       
Promotion - Any  639 13.77%  2,556 3.64% 10.13% *** 
 
Table 2, Continued 
Panel B: Multivariate Analysis – External Promotion 
 
Higher-Paid 
Position 
(1) 
 
Larger Firm 
(2) 
External 
Promotion Any 
(3) 
Main Variable    
    
Awardee 1.1084*** 1.0941** 0.7020* 
 (2.582) (2.460) (1.774) 
Control Variables    
    
Firm size -0.4848*** -0.5533** -0.4924*** 
 (2.630) (2.225) (2.894) 
Indu. ROA 2.1968 -3.2513 0.2430 
 (0.747) (1.350) (0.099) 
Indu Stock return -0.2116 -2.1415*** -0.7984 
 (0.350) (2.874) (1.470) 
Stock vol._12mon -0.0185 -0.7293 0.1067 
 (0.011) (0.361) (0.069) 
BTM 0.8839 -0.1558 0.9234* 
 (1.538) (0.193) (1.711) 
Sales growth -3.7135*** -2.5081** -2.4318*** 
 (3.754) (2.274) (2.802) 
Leverage 1.6520 2.2806* 2.6458*** 
 (1.366) (1.673) (2.621) 
Log (Compensation) -0.3040 -0.1550 -0.3193 
 (0.763) (0.407) (1.055) 
Log (Tenure ) -1.2971*** -1.6289*** -1.1371*** 
 (3.005) (4.329) (3.465) 
Log (Age) -3.5188* -0.6317 -3.1466* 
 (1.833) (0.306) (1.898) 
Executive director 0.3977 0.4033 0.1853 
 (0.474) (0.577) (0.243) 
Board Independence 0.5298 -2.2645 1.9849 
 (0.226) (1.091) (1.007) 
Num. of Analysts-3yr 0.0102 -0.0151 -0.0092 
 (0.550) (0.737) (0.486) 
Constant 13.5474* 5.7650 11.3862* 
 (1.857) (0.762) (1.809) 
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.30 0.29 
Observations 3,195 3,195 3,195 
 
  
Table 2, Continued  
Panel C: Multivariate Analysis – Internal Promotion  
 
Exe. Director 
(1) 
COO/President 
(2) 
Internal 
Promotion Any 
(3) 
In./Ex. 
Promotion Any 
(4) 
Main Variable     
     
Awardee 2.0015*** 2.8436*** 1.9268*** 1.5653*** 
 (6.771) (8.174) (9.942) (9.482) 
Control Variables     
     
Firm size -0.0404 -0.4635** -0.0610 -0.1624* 
 (0.332) (2.202) (0.487) (1.662) 
Indu. ROA -3.8895 -2.5064 -3.2364** -0.6661 
 (1.292) (1.031) (1.970) (0.389) 
Indu Stock return 2.1207*** -0.0315 0.5730* 0.2557 
 (4.377) (0.052) (1.694) (0.873) 
Stock vol._12mon -5.1924*** -0.5750 -2.8592** -1.3677 
 (3.041) (0.323) (2.553) (1.526) 
BTM 0.7580 -0.5172 0.4980 0.9330** 
 (1.127) (0.574) (1.073) (2.512) 
Sales growth -0.4399 1.7266** 1.4474*** 0.5751 
 (0.640) (2.527) (3.663) (1.558) 
Leverage -0.4282 1.5389 -3.0989*** -0.7421 
 (0.275) (1.186) (3.291) (0.770) 
Log (Compensation) 0.0324 0.5946* 0.3713** 0.2006 
 (0.151) (1.724) (1.977) (1.330) 
Log (Tenure ) 1.6188*** -0.6915 0.6798*** 0.1334 
 (4.491) (1.561) (2.679) (0.665) 
Log (Age) -2.2323 -7.1085*** -4.3734*** -3.8386*** 
 (1.346) (3.061) (3.821) (4.065) 
Executive director  1.9168*** 1.3061*** 1.0778*** 
  (4.101) (4.667) (4.258) 
Board Independence 1.1683 1.5154 2.9123** 2.6196** 
 (0.701) (0.830) (2.529) (2.495) 
Num. of Analysts-3yr -0.0263 0.0283 -0.0190 -0.0209* 
 (1.316) (1.428) (1.394) (1.915) 
Constant 0.2491 19.1009** 4.6788 6.5773* 
 (0.038) (2.265) (1.079) (1.871) 
Pseudo R2 0.30 0.37 0.29 0.21 
Observations 2,651 3,123 3,195 3,195 
  
Table 3 
Changes in the Compensation Package of Retained CFOs  
This table reports the results of OLS analyses explaining the changes in the compensation package 
around award events for retained CFOs. The sample only includes awardees and matched non-
awardees who are retained in the current firm at year t+1. The changes are measured from year t-1 
to year t+1. In Column (1) to (3), the dependent variable is the changes in the dollar value of total 
compensation, stock and option grants, and salary, respectively. Awardee is an indicator equal to 1 
if the CFO receives the award at year t. Other variables are defined as described in Appendix 2. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent level. All regressions include indicators 
for event years and Fama French 48 industries (not reported). Absolute values of t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses, and are based on robust standard errors. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 Total Compensation 
(1) 
Stock/Option Grants  
(2) 
Salary 
 (3) 
Main Variable    
Awardee 798.1323*** 430.4111*** 18.0797*** 
 (3.544) (4.599) (2.810) 
Control Variables    
Firm size 520.3763*** 142.3835*** 8.1309*** 
 (7.245) (4.019) (2.920) 
Indu. ROA 847.1993 259.3333 60.9711* 
 (1.021) (0.370) (1.845) 
Indu Stock return 877.0912*** 834.2487*** 10.1897 
 (4.049) (4.801) (0.803) 
Stock vol._12mon 1,562.5812*** -146.2207 -49.7942* 
 (2.618) (0.414) (1.818) 
BTM 1,145.5164*** 392.8906** 18.6652 
 (4.244) (2.445) (1.184) 
Sales growth 531.5556 249.9977 49.9481*** 
 (0.975) (1.099) (3.658) 
Leverage -818.7912 -280.3214 40.7266* 
 (1.569) (1.061) (1.863) 
Log (CFO Compensation) -878.1500*** -52.1316 -18.5886*** 
 (7.315) (0.779) (4.537) 
Log (Tenure ) 527.3192*** 172.1064** -34.5346*** 
 (3.998) (2.490) (6.110) 
Log (Age) -3,329.0542*** 574.9352 -101.3215*** 
 (4.440) (1.570) (3.883) 
Executive director 450.0264* -203.7362* 10.1206 
 (1.877) (1.939) (0.974) 
Board Independence 3,394.8621*** 1,267.8966*** 21.9325 
 (6.088) (3.995) (0.901) 
Num. of Analysts-3yr 18.6064* 14.4785*** 1.0548*** 
 (1.769) (3.294) (3.508) 
Constant 9,393.7227*** -3,434.4907** 542.8450*** 
 (3.935) (2.446) (5.104) 
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.17 0.16 
Observations 2,720 2,720 2,720 
Table 4 
CEO Power and CFO Incentives after Awards 
Panel A presents the effects of CFO awards on CEO PI. I report estimates of the following 
regressions: 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1𝛾 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  ( Column (1)), and 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +
∑ 𝛽𝜏
1𝑃𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡−𝜏
2
𝜏=1 + 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + ∑ 𝛽𝜏
2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡+𝜏
3
𝜏=1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1𝛾 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(Column (2)), where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the CEO PI of company i in year t, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 indicates three years 
after the incumbent CFO of company i wins the award for the first time, 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡−𝜏  indicates 
year 𝜏 before the incumbent CFO of company i wins the award for the first time, 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
indicates the year when the CFO of company i is granted the award, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡+𝜏 indicates year 
𝜏 after the award, 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 is the vector of firm and individual controls at year t-1, 𝜂𝑡  are year fixed 
effects, and 𝜂𝑖 are firm fixed effects. Panel B reports the effects of CFO awards on CFO delta and 
CFO PPS. The two regressions are estimated as described above. In Column (1) and (2), 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the 
CFO delta of company i in year t, while in Column (3) and (4) 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the CFO PPS. CEO PI, CFO 
delta, and CFO PPS are defended as described in the text. Other variables are all defined as 
described in Appendix 2. All the controls, except for Firm Size and BTM, are measured as of the 
end of fiscal year preceding an award month. Firm Size and BTM are measured as of the beginning 
of t-1. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th of the distribution. Absolute values of 
t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
Panel A: CEO PI after Awards 
 
CEO PI 
(1) 
CEO PI 
(2) 
Post Award (t+1) to (t+3) -0.1098***  
 (2.682)  
Pre Award (t-2)  0.0216 
  (0.380) 
Pre Award (t-1)  -0.0519 
  (0.998) 
Award Year  -0.0418 
  (0.801) 
Post Award (t+1)  -0.0884* 
  (1.678) 
Post Award (t+2)  -0.1299** 
  (2.252) 
Post Award (t+3)  -0.1546*** 
  (2.616) 
Firm Size 0.0456*** 0.0460*** 
 (3.034) (3.052) 
Indu. Adj. ROA 0.1340* 0.1349* 
 (1.658) (1.669) 
Indu. Adj. Stock return 0.0317 0.0330 
 (1.100) (1.151) 
BTM 0.0123 0.0123 
 (0.902) (0.903) 
CF vol._3yr -0.6844** -0.6853** 
 (2.496) (2.500) 
Sales growth 0.0038 0.0038 
 (0.157) (0.156) 
Table 4, Continued   
   
Leverage 0.1663 0.1650 
 (1.582) (1.573) 
Log (Tenure) -0.3122*** -0.3118*** 
 (17.743) (17.711) 
CEO is Chair 0.2209*** 0.2209*** 
 (8.926) (8.925) 
Constant 3.2371*** 3.2332*** 
 (22.704) (22.634) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.09 
Observations 14,824 14,824 
 
  
Table 4, Continued 
Panel B: CFO Delta and PPS after Awards 
 
CFO Delta 
(1) 
CFO Delta 
(2) 
CFO PPS 
(3) 
CFO PPS 
(4) 
Post-Award (t+1) to (t+3) 30.5001***  0.0164***  
 (3.530)  (2.936)  
Pre-Award (t-2)  -22.5536*  -0.0137 
  (1.806)  (1.476) 
Pre-Award (t-1)  -1.5402  -0.0089 
  (0.105)  (0.901) 
Award Year  -1.2444  -0.0087 
  (0.093)  (0.973) 
Post-Award (t+1)  10.7902  0.0015 
  (0.824)  (0.167) 
Post-Award (t+2)  31.0426**  0.0094 
  (2.423)  (1.073) 
Post-Award (t+3)  47.6473***  0.0319*** 
  (3.951)  (3.944) 
Firm Size 14.3864*** 14.2057*** 0.0188*** 0.0187*** 
 (7.753) (7.697) (10.778) (10.753) 
Indu. Adj. ROA 5.0113 4.1368 0.0204** 0.0198** 
 (0.564) (0.464) (2.068) (2.009) 
Indu. Adj. Stock return 3.9319 3.8281 0.0028 0.0029 
 (1.195) (1.167) (0.902) (0.925) 
BTM -0.0842 -0.2376 -0.0006 -0.0008 
 (0.073) (0.209) (0.565) (0.694) 
Sales growth 9.1747** 9.5436** 0.0170*** 0.0173*** 
 (2.381) (2.499) (5.008) (5.121) 
Leverage -14.2071 -14.7263 -0.0112 -0.0119 
 (1.425) (1.480) (0.934) (0.994) 
Log (Age) 37.5791*** 37.0072*** 0.0243* 0.0236* 
 (2.719) (2.655) (1.806) (1.748) 
Log (Tenure) 42.4207*** 42.2381*** 0.0421*** 0.0420*** 
 (16.339) (16.290) (19.047) (19.016) 
Executive Director 69.5743*** 68.8757*** 0.0358*** 0.0352*** 
 (6.011) (5.982) (5.293) (5.228) 
CEO is Chair 1.2942 1.0881 0.0033 0.0031 
 (0.486) (0.410) (1.433) (1.333) 
Board Independence -11.7050 -12.3304 -0.0088 -0.0091 
 (1.055) (1.112) (0.794) (0.830) 
Constant -235.4107*** -229.4174*** -0.1940*** -0.1893*** 
 (4.289) (4.157) (3.771) (3.658) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18 
Observations 15,250 15,250 15,250 15,250 
  
Table 5 
Discretionary Accruals and CFO Awards 
This table presents the effects of CFO awards on discretionary accruals. Two regressions are 
estimated as described in the text. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡−𝜏, 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟,  and 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡+𝜏 are defined as described in Table 4. Panel A presents the award effects on the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals. The dependent variable |DA1| is the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals estimated using Model I, while |DA2| is computed using Model II. Panel B 
reports the effects of CFO awards on signed accruals. DA1 and DA2 are signed discretionary 
accruals estimated using Model I and Model II, respectively. Panel C employs a subsample where 
firms hold positive discretionary accruals. DA1+ is positive accruals estimated using Model I, while 
DA2+ is computed using Model II. Panel D uses a subsample where firms hold negative 
discretionary accruals. DA1- is negative accruals estimated using Model I, while DA2- is computed 
using Model II. Other variables are all defined as described in Appendix 2. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at 1st and 99th. Absolute values of t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.   
Panel A: Magnitude of Accruals and CFO Awards 
 |DA1| 
(1) 
|DA1| 
 (2) 
|DA2| 
 (3) 
|DA2| 
 (4) 
Post-Award (t+1) to (t+3) -0.0047***  -0.0043***  
 (3.417)  (3.141)  
Pre-Award (t-2)  -0.0043  -0.0036 
  (1.621)  (1.377) 
Pre-Award (t-1)  -0.0031  -0.0031 
  (1.433)  (1.460) 
Award Year  -0.0038  -0.0033 
  (1.554)  (1.381) 
Post-Award (t+1)  -0.0069***  -0.0059*** 
  (3.099)  (2.674) 
Post-Award (t+2)  -0.0072***  -0.0053** 
  (3.013)  (2.286) 
Post-Award (t+3)  -0.0039*  -0.0055** 
  (1.751)  (2.518) 
CFO PPS 0.0183*** 0.0179*** 0.0172*** 0.0169*** 
 (2.962) (2.894) (2.823) (2.764) 
CEO PPS 0.0050 0.0050 0.0045 0.0045 
 (1.556) (1.541) (1.432) (1.419) 
CEO PI -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0007 
 (0.948) (0.927) (1.120) (1.106) 
Firm Size -0.0017* -0.0018* -0.0021** -0.0021** 
 (1.800) (1.821) (2.178) (2.197) 
Indu. Adj. ROA -0.0072 -0.0073 -0.0080 -0.0080 
 (1.018) (1.031) (1.110) (1.119) 
Indu. Adj. Stock return -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0014 -0.0013 
 (0.149) (0.099) (0.677) (0.629) 
BTM -0.0020* -0.0021* -0.0016 -0.0016 
 (1.708) (1.734) (1.316) (1.337) 
CF vol._3yr 0.0243 0.0241 0.0295 0.0292 
 (0.998) (0.987) (1.196) (1.184) 
Table 5, Continued 
 
    
Sales growth 0.0010 0.0011 0.0008 0.0010 
 (0.418) (0.472) (0.351) (0.395) 
Leverage -0.0239*** -0.0242*** -0.0238*** -0.0241*** 
 (4.153) (4.206) (4.223) (4.268) 
Log (CFO Age) -0.0029 -0.0031 -0.0042 -0.0044 
 (0.555) (0.599) (0.854) (0.894) 
Log (CFO Tenure) -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0009 
 (1.130) (1.138) (0.920) (0.923) 
CEO is Chair -0.0020* -0.0021* -0.0018 -0.0018 
 (1.760) (1.801) (1.542) (1.562) 
Constant 0.0787*** 0.0803*** 0.0867*** 0.0881*** 
 (3.598) (3.668) (4.090) (4.149) 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Observations 13,465 13,465 13,465 13,465 
 
  
Table 5, Continued 
Panel B: Signed Accruals and CFO Awards 
 DA1 
(1) 
DA1 
(2) 
DA2 
(3) 
DA2 
(4) 
Post-Award (t+1) to (t+3) -0.0037*  -0.0038**  
 (1.961)  (2.030)  
Pre-Award (t-2)  -0.0032  -0.0030 
  (0.896)  (0.843) 
Pre-Award (t-1)  -0.0024  -0.0022 
  (0.746)  (0.686) 
Award Year  -0.0035  -0.0034 
  (1.218)  (1.188) 
Post-Award (t+1)  -0.0084***  -0.0085*** 
  (3.105)  (3.119) 
Post-Award (t+2)  -0.0069**  -0.0070** 
  (2.438)  (2.473) 
Post-Award (t+3)  0.0028  0.0027 
  (1.035)  (1.004) 
CFO PPS -0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0006 -0.0011 
 (0.127) (0.191) (0.083) (0.144) 
CEO PPS 0.0005 0.0005 0.0003 0.0003 
 (0.119) (0.106) (0.080) (0.067) 
CEO PI -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010 
 (1.292) (1.239) (1.228) (1.175) 
Firm Size 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 
 (0.184) (0.179) (0.247) (0.243) 
Indu. Adj. ROA 0.0110 0.0108 0.0258*** 0.0257*** 
 (1.301) (1.279) (3.044) (3.020) 
Indu. Adj. Stock return 0.0075*** 0.0076*** 0.0086*** 0.0086*** 
 (2.731) (2.738) (3.120) (3.126) 
BTM -0.0033** -0.0034** -0.0033** -0.0034** 
 (2.348) (2.380) (2.348) (2.380) 
CF vol._3yr -0.0093 -0.0094 -0.0117 -0.0118 
 (0.330) (0.333) (0.414) (0.416) 
Sales growth 0.0008 0.0010 0.0014 0.0016 
 (0.247) (0.295) (0.441) (0.487) 
Leverage -0.0206*** -0.0209*** -0.0205*** -0.0207*** 
 (3.164) (3.200) (3.145) (3.179) 
Log (CFO Age) -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0021 -0.0022 
 (0.328) (0.351) (0.311) (0.333) 
Log (CFO Tenure) -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0013 
 (1.039) (1.046) (1.033) (1.040) 
CEO is Chair -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0009 
 (0.545) (0.619) (0.563) (0.636) 
Constant 0.0201 0.0212 0.0071 0.0081 
 (0.729) (0.766) (0.257) (0.292) 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Observations 13,465 13,465 13,465 13,465 
Table 5, Continued 
Panel C: Signed Accruals and CFO Awards – Positive Accruals 
 DA1+ 
(1) 
DA1+ 
(2) 
DA2+ 
(3) 
DA2+ 
(4) 
Post-Award (t+1) to (t+3) -0.0053***  -0.0046***  
 (3.304)  (2.809)  
Pre-Award (t-2)  -0.0045  -0.0048 
  (1.381)  (1.476) 
Pre-Award (t-1)  -0.0037  -0.0043* 
  (1.506)  (1.704) 
Award Year  -0.0054**  -0.0043 
  (2.060)  (1.468) 
Post-Award (t+1)  -0.0097***  -0.0083*** 
  (3.688)  (3.051) 
Post-Award (t+2)  -0.0062**  -0.0042 
  (2.410)  (1.526) 
Post-Award (t+3)  -0.0045*  -0.0057** 
  (1.857)  (2.248) 
CFO PPS 0.0091 0.0084 0.0132** 0.0126** 
 (1.452) (1.347) (2.053) (1.962) 
CEO PPS 0.0032 0.0031 0.0026 0.0025 
 (0.917) (0.864) (0.689) (0.655) 
CEO PI -0.0012* -0.0012* -0.0008 -0.0008 
 (1.756) (1.712) (1.144) (1.124) 
Firm Size -0.0022** -0.0022** -0.0022** -0.0022** 
 (2.177) (2.147) (2.056) (2.029) 
Indu. Adj. ROA -0.0021 -0.0023 -0.0036 -0.0038 
 (0.279) (0.297) (0.423) (0.443) 
Indu. Adj. Stock return 0.0033 0.0034 0.0039 0.0039 
 (1.405) (1.442) (1.562) (1.588) 
BTM -0.0034** -0.0034** -0.0037** -0.0038** 
 (2.498) (2.555) (2.377) (2.421) 
CF vol._3yr 0.0237 0.0237 0.0081 0.0082 
 (0.983) (0.983) (0.317) (0.318) 
Sales growth 0.0009 0.0011 0.0010 0.0013 
 (0.350) (0.447) (0.386) (0.476) 
Leverage -0.0299*** -0.0302*** -0.0318*** -0.0321*** 
 (5.204) (5.277) (5.217) (5.270) 
Log (CFO Age) -0.0050 -0.0053 -0.0054 -0.0057 
 (0.942) (0.995) (0.985) (1.042) 
Log (CFO Tenure) -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0011 
 (1.220) (1.205) (1.006) (1.002) 
CEO is Chair -0.0019 -0.0020 -0.0013 -0.0013 
 (1.551) (1.591) (0.958) (0.978) 
Constant 0.0923*** 0.0938*** 0.0910*** 0.0928*** 
 (4.136) (4.201) (3.919) (3.986) 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Observations 9,773 9,773 8,643 8,643 
Table 5, Continued 
Panel D: Signed Accruals and CFO Awards – Negative Accruals 
 DA1- 
(1) 
DA1- 
(2) 
DA2- 
(3) 
DA2- 
(4) 
Post-Award (t+1) to (t+3) 0.0040  0.0051**  
 (1.438)  (2.031)  
Pre-Award (t-2)  -0.0011  -0.0019 
  (0.225)  (0.427) 
Pre-Award (t-1)  0.0003  -0.0011 
  (0.057)  (0.292) 
Award Year  -0.0028  0.0018 
  (0.511)  (0.440) 
Post-Award (t+1)  0.0003  0.0005 
  (0.067)  (0.134) 
Post-Award (t+2)  0.0058  0.0067* 
  (1.126)  (1.707) 
Post-Award (t+3)  0.0055  0.0107** 
  (1.044)  (2.246) 
CFO PPS -0.0339*** -0.0339*** -0.0266*** -0.0268*** 
 (2.856) (2.841) (2.719) (2.740) 
CEO PPS -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0027 -0.0026 
 (0.139) (0.128) (0.536) (0.504) 
CEO PI -0.0027** -0.0027** -0.0014 -0.0014 
 (2.165) (2.156) (1.283) (1.264) 
Firm Size 0.0029* 0.0029* 0.0017 0.0016 
 (1.742) (1.698) (1.140) (1.092) 
Indu. Adj. ROA 0.0095 0.0096 0.0017 0.0017 
 (0.955) (0.956) (0.197) (0.195) 
Indu. Adj. Stock return 0.0079* 0.0079* 0.0090** 0.0089** 
 (1.849) (1.829) (2.447) (2.411) 
BTM 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0012 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.602) (0.617) 
CF vol._3yr -0.0418 -0.0426 -0.0699* -0.0702* 
 (1.121) (1.140) (1.906) (1.911) 
Sales growth -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0021 0.0021 
 (0.202) (0.193) (0.530) (0.541) 
Leverage 0.0092 0.0091 0.0060 0.0059 
 (0.830) (0.827) (0.637) (0.632) 
Log (CFO Age) -0.0189* -0.0187* -0.0104 -0.0104 
 (1.830) (1.807) (1.149) (1.146) 
Log (CFO Tenure) 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0009 
 (0.457) (0.433) (0.523) (0.492) 
CEO is Chair 0.0038 0.0037 0.0051*** 0.0050** 
 (1.589) (1.570) (2.579) (2.540) 
Constant 0.0061 0.0059 -0.0207 -0.0202 
 (0.149) (0.142) (0.554) (0.540) 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Observations 3,692 3,692 4,822 4,822 
Table 6 
Discretionary Accruals and CFO Awards - CEO PI Subsample Comparison 
This table presents the effects of CFO awards in CEO PI subsamples. Panel A reports the award 
effects on the magnitude of discretionary accruals of company i in year t. The dependent variable 
|DA1| is defined as described in Table 5. Column (1) employs the subsample where the CEO PI is 
above the sample median, while Column (2) employs the subsample where CEO PI is below the 
sample median. Panel B presents the award effects on the changes of discretionary accruals. The 
dependent variable ∆|DA1| is the three-year changes in the magnitude of discretionary accruals of 
company i. Column (1) employs the subsample where the CEO PI is above the sample median, 
while Column (2) employs the subsample where CEO PI is below the sample median. Other 
variables are all defined as described in Appendix 2. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st 
and 99th. Absolute values of t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Standard errors are clustered 
by firm. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
Panel A: Subsample Comparison- the Magnitude of Accruals 
 |DA1| 
(High CEO PI) 
(1) 
|DA1| 
(Low CEO PI) 
(2) 
Post-Award (t+1) to (t+3) -0.0058*** -0.0032 
 (3.029) (1.257) 
CFO PPS 0.0119 0.0210** 
 (1.259) (2.212) 
CEO PPS 0.0064 -0.0009 
 (1.259) (0.192) 
Firm Size -0.0029* -0.0013 
 (1.874) (0.936) 
Indu. Adj. ROA 0.0019 -0.0106 
 (0.183) (1.162) 
Indu. Adj. Stock return 0.0059** -0.0033 
 (1.994) (1.008) 
BTM -0.0001 -0.0057*** 
 (0.073) (2.877) 
CF vol._3yr 0.0196 0.0048 
 (0.544) (0.123) 
Sales growth -0.0073* 0.0062** 
 (1.924) (2.085) 
Leverage -0.0159* -0.0434*** 
 (1.790) (4.852) 
Log (CFO Age) 0.0017 -0.0088 
 (0.217) (1.136) 
Log (CFO Tenure) -0.0005 -0.0003 
 (0.317) (0.234) 
CEO is Chair -0.0034** 0.0000 
 (1.993) (0.010) 
Constant 0.0662** 0.1039*** 
 (2.025) (3.340) 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.02 
Observations 6,735 6,730 
Table 6, Continued 
Panel B: Subsample Comparison-the Changes in Accruals 
 ∆|DA1| 
(High CEO PI) 
(1) 
∆|DA1| 
(Low CEO PI) 
 (2) 
Post-Award (t+1) to (t+3) -0.0082** 0.0005 
 (2.441) (0.110) 
CFO PPS 0.0138 -0.0148 
 (0.782) (1.066) 
CEO PPS -0.0023 -0.0041 
 (0.304) (0.560) 
Firm Size -0.0052** -0.0039* 
 (2.082) (1.817) 
Indu. Adj. ROA -0.0079 -0.0156 
 (0.455) (1.065) 
Indu. Adj. Stock return 0.0108** 0.0023 
 (2.297) (0.484) 
BTM -0.0010 -0.0055* 
 (0.399) (1.774) 
CF vol._3yr -0.3211*** -0.2480*** 
 (5.182) (4.190) 
Sales growth 0.0011 0.0103** 
 (0.190) (1.982) 
Leverage -0.0210 -0.0613*** 
 (1.425) (4.366) 
Log (CFO Age) 0.0087 -0.0074 
 (0.616) (0.596) 
Log (CFO Tenure) -0.0027 0.0040* 
 (1.074) (1.768) 
CEO is Chair -0.0032 -0.0029 
 (0.978) (1.090) 
Constant 0.0061 0.0582 
 (0.108) (1.191) 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 
Observations 6,676 6,653 
Table 7 
Accruals and CFO Awards: 2SLS Analysis 
This table presents the results of estimating 2SLS regressions. Column (1) reports the results from 
the first stage, while Column (2) and (3) presents the second stage. Num. of Analysts-5yr is the 
number of analysts who recommended (buy or sell) the firm’s stock in a five year window before 
the year of interest, lagged by two years. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡  is defined as described in Table 4. |DA1| 
and |DA2| are defined as described in Table 5. Other variables are all defined as described in 
Appendix 2. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent level. Absolute values 
of t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively.  
 First Stage  Second Stage 
 
Post-Award 
(t+1) to (t+3) 
(1) 
 |DA1| 
(2) 
|DA2| 
(3) 
Endogenous Variables     
Post-Award (t+1) to (t+3)   -0.1297* -0.1422* 
   (1.705) (1.840) 
Instrumental Variables     
Num. of Analysts-5yr 0.0011***    
 (3.13)    
Control Variables     
CFO PPS 0.0037  0.0104 0.0094 
 (0.11)  (1.252) (1.113) 
CEO PPS -0.0041  0.0042 0.0040 
 (0.24)  (1.026) (0.957) 
CEO PI -0.0087**  -0.0006 -0.0007 
 (2.41)  (0.573) (0.638) 
Firm Size 0.0146***  0.0005 0.0000 
 (3.12)  (0.277) (0.025) 
Indu. ROA 0.0452*  0.0029 0.0040 
 (1.81)  (0.434) (0.574) 
Indu. Stock return -0.0029  0.0013 0.0002 
 (0.27)  (0.511) (0.070) 
BTM 0.0032  -0.0004 -0.0002 
 (0.7)  (0.360) (0.213) 
CF vol._3yr 0.0454  0.0077 0.0130 
 (0.54)  (0.380) (0.633) 
Sales growth -0.0108  -0.0026 -0.0033 
 (1.18)  (1.085) (1.354) 
Leverage -0.0353  -0.0312*** -0.0299*** 
 (1.46)  (4.905) (4.634) 
Log (Age) -0.1228  -0.1047* -0.1132* 
 (0.5)  (1.783) (1.896) 
     
   
Table 7, Continued  
  
  
Log (Tenure) 0.1120***  0.0114 0.0129 
 (9.29)  (1.271) (1.419) 
CEO is Chair -0.0111*  -0.0047*** -0.0047*** 
 (1.77)  (2.730) (2.646) 
Constant 0.1556  0.4443* 0.4725** 
 (0.16)  (1.911) (2.000) 
Year FE 
Yes 
 Yes Yes 
Firm FE 
Yes 
 Yes Yes 
Partial  R2 0.06    
Observations 13,465  13,465 13,465 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic   9.83*** 9.83*** 
Anderson–Rubin F-statistic   4.03** 5.03** 
Table 8 
Pre-Award Period and Awardee Moving 
This table presents the results of conducting four subsample tests. Column (1) employs a subsample 
that only includes past awardees and non-awardees. Column (2) uses a subsample that only includes 
future awardees and non-awardees. Column (3) employs a subsample where a past awardee leaves 
the firm during the sample period. Column (4) employs a subsample where a firm hires a past 
awardee during the sample period. Past Awardee indicates that the incumbent CFO wins the award 
before a given year.  Future Awardee indicates that the incumbent CFO who receives the award in 
or after a given year. Awardee-Leaving indicates the period after a past awardee’s departure. 
Hiring-Awardee indicates the period after hiring a past awardee. Other variables are all defined as 
described in Appendix 2. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th of the distribution. 
Absolute values of t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 |DA1| 
(1) 
|DA1| 
(2) 
|DA1| 
(3) 
|DA1| 
(4) 
Past Awardee -0.0057***    
 (2.752)    
Future Awardee  -0.0006   
  (0.251)   
Awardee-Leaving   0.0037  
   (1.401)  
Hiring- Awardee    -0.0078** 
    (2.282) 
PPS 0.0218*** 0.0187*** 0.0318*** 0.0336** 
 (3.079) (2.583) (2.689) (2.020) 
CEO_PPS 0.0054 0.0054 0.0028 0.0040 
 (1.531) (1.538) (0.385) (0.255) 
CEO PI -0.0008 -0.0007 0.0004 0.0020 
 (1.118) (0.973) (0.269) (1.280) 
Firm Size -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0020 -0.0096* 
 (1.425) (1.552) (0.569) (1.812) 
Indu. ROA -0.0091 -0.0083 -0.0201 -0.0002 
 (1.264) (1.129) (1.008) (0.010) 
Indu. Stock return 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0014 -0.0042 
 (0.079) (0.102) (0.231) (0.457) 
BTM -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0006 -0.0046 
 (1.567) (1.598) (0.442) (1.087) 
CF vol._3yr 0.0156 0.0221 -0.0180 -0.0490 
 (0.618) (0.874) (0.208) (0.524) 
Sales growth 0.0008 0.0011 -0.0019 0.0092 
 (0.309) (0.428) (0.256) (0.990) 
Leverage -0.0265*** -0.0266*** -0.0124 0.0025 
 (4.469) (4.420) (0.509) (0.076) 
Log (CFO Age) -0.0042 -0.0040 -0.0013 0.0229 
 (0.789) (0.743) (0.109) (1.372) 
Log (CFO Tenure) -0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0039 -0.0049 
 (0.661) (0.986) (1.451) (1.484) 
CEO is Chair -0.0026** -0.0019 -0.0005 -0.0063* 
 (2.152) (1.529) (0.149) (1.701) 
Table 8, Continued     
Constant 0.0833*** 0.0835*** 0.0631 0.0355 
 (3.691) (3.664) (1.003) (0.373) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.09 
Observations 12,566 12,388 1,465 520 
 
 
  
Table 9 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Surrounding Non-Reliance Restatements 
This table presents cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding non-reliance restatements of 
affiliated firms covered in my sample, separated by awardee firms and non-awardee firms. The 
sample includes all the non-reliance restatements reported by Audit Analytics which are made by 
sample firms. Column (1) presents CARs for all affiliated firms where a past awardee is serving as 
the CFO, while Column (2) for other affiliated firms. CARs are calculated using market adjusted 
returns with CRSP value-weighted index as the proxy for market returns. Event windows are in 
trading days. Event dates on non-trading days are transferred to the next trading day. 𝛼 and 𝛽 are 
estimated using a 250-date period which ends 60 days before the event date. At least 60 days of 
return data is required for estimation. Patell z statistics are presented in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
  
 
Event Window Past Awardees 
(1) 
Other Companies 
(2) 
   
( -3,+3 ) -0.40%* -1.02%***  
 (1.41) (5.92) 
( -2,+2 ) -0.57%** -1.03%*** 
 (1.70) (6.73) 
( -2,+1 ) -0.24%* -1.15%*** 
 (1.29) (8.42) 
Observations 72 1163 
Table 10 
Non-Reliance Restatements and CFO Awards 
This table presents the effects of CFO awards on the number of non-reliance restatements. I employ 
a fixed effect model estimated as described in the text. The dependent variable in Column (1) to (3) 
is, respectively, the number of all the non-reliance restatements announced by firm i at year t, the 
number of restatements which are due to errors made by the current CFO, and the number of 
restatements due to errors made by predecessors of the current CFO. ∆ Accounts Receivable and ∆ 
Inventory are the changes measured from year t-1 to year t. Other controls are lagged by one year. 
Variables are defined as described in Appendix 2. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st 
and 99th of the distribution. Absolute values of t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 Res-All 
(1) 
Res-Current CFO  
 (2) 
Res- Predecessor 
 (3) 
Post-Award (t+1) to (t+3) -0.0095* -0.0029 -0.0066** 
 (0.07) (0.48) (0.03) 
Firm Size 0.0024 0.0008 0.0016 
 (0.26) (0.58) (0.30) 
Log (Firm Age) 0.0198** 0.0105 0.0094 
 (0.04) (0.12) (0.19) 
Log (Num. of Segments) 0.0085 0.0100* -0.0014 
 (0.38) (0.07) (0.86) 
Indu. Adj. ROA 0.0063 0.0047 0.0015 
 (0.72) (0.69) (0.90) 
Indu. Adj. Stock return -0.0018 -0.0037 0.0019 
 (0.76) (0.38) (0.62) 
BTM 0.0014 0.0012 0.0001 
 (0.51) (0.39) (0.93) 
Sales growth 0.0007 0.0030 -0.0022 
 (0.89) (0.44) (0.54) 
Loss 0.0110** 0.0048 0.0062* 
 (0.02) (0.16) (0.09) 
Restructure -0.0033 -0.0045* 0.0012 
 (0.30) (0.05) (0.60) 
Acquisition -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.37) (0.26) (0.71) 
∆ Accounts Receivable -0.0006 0.0011 -0.0017 
 (0.87) (0.61) (0.54) 
∆ Inventory -0.1259** -0.1111** -0.0149 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.59) 
Board Independence -0.0485*** -0.0243* -0.0243** 
 (0.01) (0.06) (0.05) 
Constant -0.0599* -0.0299 -0.0300 
 (0.09) (0.17) (0.29) 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Observations 14,572 14,572 14,572 
Appendix 1: The “America’s Best CFOs” Award 
With a circulation of 130,000, Institutional Investor is a monthly periodical magazine 
published by Euromoney Institutional Investor, one of the Europe’s largest business and financial 
magazine publishers. The magazine is well-known for providing global research and rankings that 
often serve as industry benchmarks. Each year from 2004 through 2009, Institutional Investor 
published an annual list of “America’s Best CFOs” which recognizes excellence of top finance 
executives in the nation. In 2010, the magazine published the list of “The All-America Executive 
Team” and terminated to provide the “America’s Best CFOs” list. “The All-America Executive 
Team” award separately honors CEOs, CFOs and companies.  
To determine the recipients of the “America’s Best CFOs”, each year Institutional Investor 
sends surveys to investment professionals (e.g., fund managers, securities analysts, and researchers) 
in both the buy-side and the sell-side, asking them to name the best CFOs in their coverage universe. 
All the voters must meet eligibility requirements. To ensure continuing cooperation form survey 
respondents, the magazine keeps confidential the identities of them. According to the magazine, 
the number of responses ranges from hundreds to more than one thousand. In 2015, for instance, 
more than 1,250 buy-side analysts and money managers in 660 firms responded the survey for “The 
All-America Executive Team”. All the votes are subject to the review by the magazine’s own 
research operations group. Winners must achieve a minimum number of votes. According to the 
award organizer, final results may be inspected by an independent auditor.  
Each year, the award list was released in the Institutional Investor website and in the 
magazine. I obtained the list from archived internet websites, press releases, and the digital version 
of the magazine. These sources also provide the access to the information of the announcement 
dates of the award. I set the announcement date as the earliest date that the awardee list appears in 
any of these sources. 
Appendix 2: Data Sources and Variable Definitions 
Variable Source Definition 
Acquisition Compustat An indicator equal to 1 if the firm engages in 
acquisitions in a given fiscal year. 
Board independence BoardEx, 
RiskMetrics 
Percentage of directors on the board who are 
deemed independent according to the applicable 
NYSE or Nasdaq regulatory definitions. 
BTM Compustat Book to market ratio measured as of the 
beginning of the fiscal year. 
Cash holding Compustat The ratio of cash and short-term investments to 
the book value of total assets. 
CF vol._3yr Compustat The standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations deflated by total assets over the 
current year and the past two years. 
CEO is Chair BoardEx, 
RiskMetrics 
A dummy variable which is 1 if a senior 
executive is also the chairman on the board and 
0 otherwise. 
CEO PI Execucomp The sum of six factors indicating CEO’s 
relative power over CFO. These factors include 
relative age, relative directorship, relative 
number of titles, founder indicator, relative 
stock, and relative option. Detailed information 
is described in the text. 
∆ Accounts Receivable Compustat Changes in accounts receivable in a given fiscal 
year. 
∆ Inventory Compustat Changes in inventory scaled by the average of 
total assets and lagged total assets. 
DA1 Compustat Discretionary accruals estimated based on 
Model I. The estimation process is described in 
the text. 
DA2 Compustat Discretionary accruals estimated based on 
Model II. The estimation process is described in 
the text. 
Delta  The dollar change in wealth associated with a 
1% change in the firm’s stock price. 
Debt maturity Compustat The ratio of long term debt that matures in more 
3 years to total debt. 
Executive director ExecuComp A dummy variable which is one if an executive 
is also an inside director on the board of the 
firm. 
Firm Size Compustat Logarithm of market cap as measured as of the 
beginning of the fiscal year. 
Firm Age Compustat The number of years since the firm has been 
included in Compustat 
Indu. ROA Compustat Firm ROA minus median industry ROA where 
industry is identified using Fama French 48-
industry code based on the Compustat universe 
of firms.  
Indu. Stock return CRSP Total compounded return over 12 months prior 
to the month of interest, adjusted by median 
industry stock return. Industry is identified 
using Fama French 48-industry code based on 
the Compustat universe of firms. 
Leverage Compustat (Long term debt + debt in current liability)/ 
(long term debt + debt in current liability + 
market value of equity). 
Loss Compustat An indicator equal to 1 if the firm’s income 
before extraordinary items is negative in a given 
fiscal year. 
Major City Compustat An indicator equal to 1 if the firm locates in one 
of the top 12 major cities ranked by 2014 real 
GDP. 
Num. of Analysts-3yr Audit Analytics The number of analysts who include the 
company in their buy/sell recommendations 
within the past three years. 
Num. of Analysts-5yr Audit Analytics The number of analysts who include the 
company in their buy/sell recommendations 
within the past five years. The 2SLS analysis 
employ a 2-year lagged variable. 
Num. of Segments Compustat The number of business segments in a given 
fiscal year. 
Past awardee  An indicator equal to 1 if the CFO is a past 
awardee who received the award before this 
event year. 
PPS Execucomp Delta over the sum of delta, salary and bonus.  
Restructure Compustat An indicator equal to 1 if the firm has a non-
zero value for any of the Comustat restructuring 
items in a given fiscal year. The restructuring 
items include RCA, RCD, RCEPS, and RCP. 
Sales growth  Compustat One year sales growth. 
Stock volatility_12mon CRSP The standard deviation of monthly stock returns 
over the 12 months prior to the fiscal year end. 
TDC1 Execucomp Total annual executive compensation, 
recalculated based on the methodology in Coles 
et al. (2014). Detailed information is provided in 
the text. 
Tenure Execucomp, 
BoardEx, 
Bloomberg, Equilar, 
proxies  
The period that one executive holds the current 
position in the given firm, measured in years. 
Appendix 3: Adjusting annual total compensation (TDC1)  
Starting from 2006, ExecuComp made significant adjustment in their data reporting in 
response to the passage of FAS 123R in December 2004. Specifically, ExecuComp reports the 
Black-Scholes value of stock option grants for the pre-FAS 123R period and reports firms’ own 
calculated fair value after2005. Since firms valuating options using their own models, TDC1 
reported by ExecuComp is not comparable across firms nor across pre- and post-FAS 123R periods.   
I adjust TDC1 in order to make it comparable throughout my sample period based on the 
methodology developed by Coles et al. (2014). I follow the ExecuComp Black- Scholes 
assumptions to re-calculate values for each stock option grant from 2006 to 2009. The ExecuComp 
assumptions are as follows: 
(1) I assume options are granted on July 1st. 
(2) I assume the strike price as the market price at the grant day. 
(3) I assume executives to hold the option for 70% of the actual term until maturity. 
(4) The risk-free rate is set as the return of 7-year Treasury bond. 
(5) Stock volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over 60 months prior to date. 
The number is winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles. If the 60 months of returns are not 
available, the actual number of monthly returns (at least 12 months) is used. If the available 
trading months are less than 12, the average volatility for the S&P 1500 firms is used. 
(6) The dividend yield is computed as the average of the last three years, winsorized at the 5th and 
95th percentiles. I recalculate the Black-Scholes value of stock option grants based on the 
estimation of these inputs. The post-FAS 123R TDC1 is then calculated as: 
TDC1 = SALARY + BONUS + NONEQ_INCENT + OTHCOMP      + 
STOCK_AWARDS_FV + estimated Black-Scholes value of option grants               
 + DEFER_RPT_AS_COMP_TOT  
Appendix 4: Market Reactions to CFO Awards 
Table A4 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Surrounding Award Events 
This table presents cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding award events for awardee 
firms. CARs are calculated using market adjusted returns with CRSP value-weighted index as the 
proxy for market returns. 𝛼 and 𝛽 are estimated using a 250-date period which ends 60 days before 
the event date. At least 60 days of return data is required for estimation. Event windows are in 
trading days. Event dates on non-trading days are transferred to the next trading day. Patell z 
statistics are presented in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
Event Window 
 
Awardee Firms 
 
  
( -3, +3 ) 0.46%** 
 (2.13) 
( -1, +1 ) 0.23%** 
 (2.28) 
(  0,  0  ) 0.11%* 
 (1.51) 
Observations 680 
 
 
Appendix 5: Propensity Score Matching 
Table A5: Determinants of CFO Awards 
Panel A reports the results of estimating a logit regression predicting the probability that a CFO 
wins the award in a given year. The sample period is from 2004 to 2012. The dependent variable 
is an indicator equal to one if the CFO wins the award in a given year. All independent variables 
are defined as described in Appendix 2. Except for Firm size and BTM, independent variables are 
all measured as of the end of the latest fiscal year prior to an award month. Firm size and BTM are 
measured as of the beginning of the fiscal year. Panel B reports the results of standardized 
difference and t tests examining whether the covariates are well balanced after the 1-to-4 nearest 
neighbor matching. Column (1) and (2) report the mean of covariates of the awardee group (treated) 
and the matched non-awardee group (control), respectively. Standardized differences of means are 
reported in Column (3). Column (4) and (5) presents the t-statistics and p-value of the t tests, 
respectively. Pseudo R2 from logit regression on matched sample is reported at the bottom. Panel C 
reports the replication of Panel A by including |DA1| in the regression. |DA1| is the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals estimated using Model I. Values of z-statistics are reported in parentheses, 
and are calculated based on robust standard errors. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  
Panel A: Logit model predicting the probability of winning the award 
 Award-winning 
  
Firm size 1.0858*** 
 (18.339) 
Indu. Adj. ROA 0.7478 
 (0.841) 
Indu. Adj. Stock return -0.0629 
 (0.181) 
Stock volatility_12mon -1.5999*** 
 (2.906) 
BTM -0.2586 
 (1.020) 
Sales growth 0.9932*** 
 (3.859) 
Leverage 0.1457 
 (0.381) 
Log (CFO Compensation) 0.8742*** 
 (9.440) 
Log (Tenure ) 0.7769*** 
 (7.624) 
Log (Age) -1.5829*** 
 (3.110) 
Executive director 1.2180*** 
 (6.868) 
Board Independence -0.1398 
 (0.262) 
Num. of Analysts-3yr 0.0483*** 
 (6.792) 
  
  
Table A5, Continued 
 
 
Constant -12.5648*** 
 (5.359) 
Industry dummies Yes 
  
Pseudo R2 0.49 
Observations 10,824 
Table A5, Continued 
 
Panel B: Covariate Balance within Matched Sample 
 Mean  t-test 
Covariate 
Treated 
(1) 
Control 
(2) 
% bias 
(3) 
 t 
(4) 
p > |t| 
(5) 
Firm size 9.69 9.71 -1.5  -0.33 0.739 
Indu. ROA 0.06 0.06 -2.9  -0.63 0.527 
Indu Stock return 0.12 0.12 0.1  0.01 0.99 
Stock volatility_12mon 0.25 0.25 -4.2  -0.95 0.344 
BTM 0.38 0.39 -3.9  -0.9 0.367 
Sales growth 0.15 0.14 1  0.22 0.824 
DA1 0.04 0.04 -6.2  -1.24 0.216 
Leverage 0.23 0.22 3.4  0.79 0.429 
Log (Compensation) 8.11 8.09 3  0.68 0.497 
Log (Tenure ) 1.95 1.91 6.5  1.4 0.162 
Log (Age) 3.92 3.93 -3.4  -0.76 0.449 
Executive director 0.18 0.17 1.7  0.38 0.707 
Board Independence 0.79 0.79 3.2  0.7 0.487 
Num. of Analysts-3yr 11.07 10.56 5.5  1.21 0.226 
Pseudo R2 from logit regression on 
matched sample 
   0.01      
  
   
  
Table A5, Continued  
Panel C: Logit model predicting the probability of winning the award – Including DA1 
 Award-winning 
  
Firm size 1.1129*** 
 (16.589) 
Indu. ROA 0.7363 
 (0.788) 
Indu Stock return 0.1806 
 (0.500) 
Stock volatility_12mon -1.6481*** 
 (2.683) 
BTM -0.3367 
 (1.100) 
Sales growth 1.1509*** 
 (3.978) 
Discretionary Accruals -0.3986 
 (0.268) 
Leverage -0.2254 
 (0.484) 
Log (CFO Compensation) 0.8913*** 
 (8.434) 
Log (Tenure ) 0.8309*** 
 (7.271) 
Log (Age) -2.1467*** 
 (3.743) 
Executive director 0.9174*** 
 (4.657) 
Board Independence 0.0682 
 (0.112) 
Num. of Analysts-3yr 0.0441*** 
 (5.841) 
Constant -11.3521*** 
 (5.144) 
Event year dummies Yes 
Industry dummies Yes 
  
Pseudo R2 0.49 
Observations 9,314 
Appendix 6: Robustness – Alternative CFO Delta and PPS 
Table A6 
CFO Incentives after Awards - Alternative CFO Delta and PPS 
This table presents the replication of Panel B in Table 4 by using new CFO delta and CFO PPS 
calculated based on unrestricted stocks and options. In Column (1) and (2), the dependent variable 
is the new CFO delta of company i in year t, while in Column (3) and (4) the dependent variable is 
the new CFO PPS. Other variables are all defined as described in Appendix 2. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th of the distribution. Absolute values of t-statistics are reported 
in the parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
 
CFO Delta 
(1) 
CFO Delta 
(2) 
CFO PPS 
(3) 
CFO PPS 
(4) 
Post-Award (t+1) to (t+3) 15.1389***  0.0077*  
 (3.246)  (1.753)  
Pre-Award (t-2)  -8.5787  -0.0070 
  (1.373)  (1.075) 
Pre-Award (t-1)  3.6936  -0.0022 
  (0.520)  (0.322) 
Award Year  4.7789  -0.0018 
  (0.756)  (0.285) 
Post-Award (t+1)  8.5395  -0.0005 
  (1.275)  (0.072) 
Post-Award (t+2)  18.4291***  0.0050 
  (2.713)  (0.775) 
Post-Award (t+3)  21.5605***  0.0179*** 
  (3.364)  (2.802) 
Firm Size 5.7250*** 5.6273*** 0.0090*** 0.0090*** 
 (5.591) (5.554) (7.034) (7.024) 
Indu. Adj. ROA -0.5665 -0.9621 0.0012 0.0008 
 (0.125) (0.211) (0.159) (0.103) 
Indu. Adj. Stock return 3.0359 2.9111 0.0032 0.0032 
 (1.519) (1.464) (1.352) (1.348) 
BTM -1.6212 -1.7471 -0.0047** -0.0049** 
 (0.769) (0.836) (2.185) (2.290) 
Sales growth 5.4539*** 5.5256*** 0.0094*** 0.0096*** 
 (2.615) (2.666) (3.849) (3.922) 
Leverage -8.6273 -8.6840 -0.0057 -0.0059 
 (1.369) (1.376) (0.662) (0.698) 
Log (Age) 34.6687*** 34.6461*** 0.0393*** 0.0390*** 
 (4.213) (4.190) (3.882) (3.840) 
Log (Tenure) 22.6325*** 22.5411*** 0.0305*** 0.0304*** 
 (15.623) (15.606) (18.632) (18.625) 
Executive Director 38.3660*** 38.1498*** 0.0302*** 0.0299*** 
 (6.356) (6.334) (5.550) (5.502) 
CEO is Chair 0.7626 0.7204 0.0020 0.0019 
 (0.499) (0.472) (1.129) (1.061) 
Board Independence -0.3333 -0.6080 -0.0002 -0.0005 
 (0.059) (0.108) (0.031) (0.062) 
Table A6, Continued     
Constant -179.0781*** -177.3278*** -0.2170*** -0.2147*** 
 (5.491) (5.425) (5.669) (5.590) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 
Observations 15,250 15,250 15,250 15,250 
 
  
Appendix 7: Robustness - Alternative CEO PI 
Table A7 
Accruals and CFO Awards- Alternative CEO PI 
This table presents the replication of Panel A to Panel D in Table 5 by replacing the relative age 
indicator with relative tenure in CEO PI. Relative tenure is an indicator equal to 1 if the CEO’s 
tenure is longer than the CFO. Panel A presents the award effects on the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals. Panel B report the effects of CFO awards on signed accruals. Panel C 
employs a subsample where firms hold positive discretionary accruals. Panel D uses a subsample 
where firms hold negative discretionary accruals. |DA1|, |DA2|, DA1+, DA2+, DA1-, and DA2- are 
defined as described in Table 5. Other variables are defined as described in Appendix 2. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th of the distribution. Absolute values of t-statistics 
are reported in the parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
 
Panel A: Magnitude of Accruals and CFO Awards 
 |DA1| 
(1) 
|DA1| 
 (2) 
|DA2| 
 (3) 
|DA2| 
 (4) 
Post-Award (t+1) to (t+3) -0.0048***  -0.0044***  
 (3.433)  (3.159)  
Pre-Award (t-2)  -0.0043  -0.0036 
  (1.613)  (1.369) 
Pre-Award (t-1)  -0.0031  -0.0031 
  (1.428)  (1.455) 
Award Year  -0.0038  -0.0033 
  (1.551)  (1.377) 
Post-Award (t+1)  -0.0068***  -0.0059*** 
  (3.097)  (2.674) 
Post-Award (t+2)  -0.0072***  -0.0053** 
  (3.024)  (2.298) 
Post-Award (t+3)  -0.0039*  -0.0055** 
  (1.767)  (2.532) 
CFO PPS 0.0179*** 0.0175*** 0.0169*** 0.0165*** 
 (2.902) (2.835) (2.776) (2.718) 
CEO PPS 0.0056* 0.0056* 0.0051 0.0051 
 (1.718) (1.701) (1.600) (1.586) 
CEO PI -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0009 
 (1.421) (1.398) (1.568) (1.553) 
Firm Size -0.0017* -0.0017* -0.0021** -0.0021** 
 (1.792) (1.813) (2.169) (2.189) 
Indu. Adj. ROA -0.0072 -0.0073 -0.0080 -0.0081 
 (1.021) (1.035) (1.114) (1.123) 
Indu. Adj. Stock return -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0014 -0.0013 
 (0.159) (0.109) (0.686) (0.639) 
BTM -0.0020* -0.0020* -0.0016 -0.0016 
 (1.692) (1.719) (1.301) (1.322) 
CF vol._3yr 0.0242 0.0239 0.0293 0.0290 
 (0.991) (0.980) (1.190) (1.178) 
     
Table A7, Continued 
 
    
Sales growth 0.0010 0.0011 0.0009 0.0010 
 (0.420) (0.473) (0.353) (0.397) 
Leverage -0.0239*** -0.0241*** -0.0238*** -0.0240*** 
 (4.139) (4.191) (4.209) (4.253) 
Log (CFO Age) -0.0026 -0.0028 -0.0039 -0.0041 
 (0.508) (0.555) (0.794) (0.835) 
Log (CFO Tenure) -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0010 
 (1.247) (1.252) (1.047) (1.048) 
CEO is Chair -0.0019 -0.0019* -0.0016 -0.0017 
 (1.622) (1.663) (1.405) (1.425) 
Constant 0.0780*** 0.0796*** 0.0855*** 0.0869*** 
 (3.707) (3.782) (4.200) (4.263) 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Observations 13,465 13,465 13,465 13,465 
  
Table A7, Continued 
Panel B: Signed Accruals and CFO Awards 
 DA1 
(1) 
DA1 
(2) 
DA2 
(3) 
DA2 
(4) 
Post-Award (t+1) to (t+3) -0.0037**  -0.0038**  
 (1.983)  (2.051)  
Pre-Award (t-2)  -0.0032  -0.0030 
  (0.887)  (0.835) 
Pre-Award (t-1)  -0.0024  -0.0022 
  (0.738)  (0.677) 
Award Year  -0.0035  -0.0034 
  (1.213)  (1.182) 
Post-Award (t+1)  -0.0084***  -0.0085*** 
  (3.095)  (3.109) 
Post-Award (t+2)  -0.0070**  -0.0071** 
  (2.457)  (2.492) 
Post-Award (t+3)  0.0027  0.0026 
  (1.003)  (0.973) 
CFO PPS -0.0019 -0.0023 -0.0015 -0.0019 
 (0.249) (0.312) (0.200) (0.261) 
CEO PPS 0.0018 0.0017 0.0015 0.0015 
 (0.404) (0.390) (0.353) (0.338) 
CEO PI -0.0016** -0.0016** -0.0016** -0.0015** 
 (2.129) (2.081) (2.020) (1.973) 
Firm Size 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 
 (0.203) (0.198) (0.265) (0.261) 
Indu. Adj. ROA 0.0110 0.0108 0.0258*** 0.0257*** 
 (1.300) (1.278) (3.042) (3.018) 
Indu. Adj. Stock return 0.0075*** 0.0075*** 0.0086*** 0.0086*** 
 (2.716) (2.723) (3.105) (3.111) 
BTM -0.0033** -0.0033** -0.0033** -0.0034** 
 (2.325) (2.358) (2.327) (2.358) 
CF vol._3yr -0.0097 -0.0097 -0.0121 -0.0121 
 (0.342) (0.345) (0.425) (0.428) 
Sales growth 0.0008 0.0010 0.0014 0.0016 
 (0.249) (0.297) (0.443) (0.489) 
Leverage -0.0205*** -0.0207*** -0.0204*** -0.0206*** 
 (3.147) (3.182) (3.128) (3.162) 
Log (CFO Age) -0.0018 -0.0020 -0.0017 -0.0019 
 (0.269) (0.298) (0.255) (0.282) 
Log (CFO Tenure) -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0015 
 (1.221) (1.224) (1.206) (1.209) 
CEO is Chair -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0006 
 (0.333) (0.408) (0.360) (0.434) 
Constant 0.0196 0.0208 0.0066 0.0077 
 (0.735) (0.778) (0.247) (0.288) 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Observations 13,465 13,465 13,465 13,465 
Table A7, Continued 
Panel C: Signed Accruals and CFO Awards – Positive Accruals 
 DA1+ 
(1) 
DA1+ 
(2) 
DA2+ 
(3) 
DA2+ 
(4) 
Post-Award (t+1) to (t+3) -0.0053***  -0.0047***  
 (3.325)  (2.839)  
Pre-Award (t-2)  -0.0045  -0.0049 
  (1.383)  (1.500) 
Pre-Award (t-1)  -0.0037  -0.0044* 
  (1.513)  (1.723) 
Award Year  -0.0054**  -0.0042 
  (2.042)  (1.463) 
Post-Award (t+1)  -0.0097***  -0.0082*** 
  (3.688)  (3.049) 
Post-Award (t+2)  -0.0062**  -0.0043 
  (2.416)  (1.549) 
Post-Award (t+3)  -0.0046*  -0.0058** 
  (1.895)  (2.311) 
CFO PPS 0.0085 0.0078 0.0121* 0.0115* 
 (1.357) (1.252) (1.892) (1.799) 
CEO PPS 0.0042 0.0040 0.0039 0.0038 
 (1.170) (1.115) (1.014) (0.983) 
CEO PI -0.0016** -0.0016** -0.0015** -0.0015** 
 (2.470) (2.427) (2.189) (2.183) 
Firm Size -0.0022** -0.0021** -0.0022** -0.0022** 
 (2.158) (2.128) (2.031) (2.004) 
Indu. Adj. ROA -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0037 -0.0039 
 (0.285) (0.303) (0.435) (0.455) 
Indu. Adj. Stock return 0.0033 0.0034 0.0038 0.0039 
 (1.388) (1.424) (1.534) (1.561) 
BTM -0.0033** -0.0034** -0.0037** -0.0037** 
 (2.462) (2.519) (2.341) (2.384) 
CF vol._3yr 0.0233 0.0232 0.0078 0.0078 
 (0.963) (0.962) (0.305) (0.305) 
Sales growth 0.0009 0.0011 0.0011 0.0013 
 (0.360) (0.457) (0.400) (0.489) 
Leverage -0.0299*** -0.0302*** -0.0317*** -0.0320*** 
 (5.199) (5.272) (5.213) (5.265) 
Log (CFO Age) -0.0044 -0.0047 -0.0052 -0.0055 
 (0.827) (0.885) (0.955) (1.016) 
Log (CFO Tenure) -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0013 
 (1.430) (1.411) (1.189) (1.185) 
CEO is Chair -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0009 -0.0010 
 (1.318) (1.360) (0.706) (0.723) 
Constant 0.0904*** 0.0921*** 0.0916*** 0.0935*** 
 (4.134) (4.204) (4.034) (4.108) 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Observations 9,773 9,773 8,643 8,643 
Table A7, Continued 
Panel D: Signed Accruals and CFO Awards – Negative Accruals 
 DA1- 
(1) 
DA1- 
(2) 
DA2- 
(3) 
DA2- 
(4) 
Post-Award (t+1) to (t+3) 0.0039  0.0050**  
 (1.418)  (2.018)  
Pre-Award (t-2)  -0.0011  -0.0017 
  (0.216)  (0.401) 
Pre-Award (t-1)  0.0004  -0.0010 
  (0.078)  (0.252) 
Award Year  -0.0029  0.0018 
  (0.532)  (0.441) 
Post-Award (t+1)  0.0002  0.0005 
  (0.051)  (0.131) 
Post-Award (t+2)  0.0055  0.0067* 
  (1.082)  (1.697) 
Post-Award (t+3)  0.0057  0.0108** 
  (1.118)  (2.278) 
CFO PPS -0.0342*** -0.0342*** -0.0269*** -0.0272*** 
 (2.868) (2.852) (2.753) (2.774) 
CEO PPS -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0019 -0.0018 
 (0.019) (0.011) (0.373) (0.342) 
CEO PI -0.0025** -0.0025** -0.0015 -0.0015 
 (2.280) (2.277) (1.607) (1.593) 
Firm Size 0.0030* 0.0030* 0.0017 0.0017 
 (1.803) (1.760) (1.158) (1.111) 
Indu. Adj. ROA 0.0096 0.0096 0.0018 0.0018 
 (0.957) (0.957) (0.207) (0.205) 
Indu. Adj. Stock return 0.0077* 0.0077* 0.0090** 0.0089** 
 (1.800) (1.780) (2.439) (2.401) 
BTM 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0012 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.591) (0.605) 
CF vol._3yr -0.0417 -0.0425 -0.0704* -0.0706* 
 (1.118) (1.138) (1.919) (1.923) 
Sales growth -0.0009 -0.0009 0.0021 0.0021 
 (0.216) (0.207) (0.531) (0.541) 
Leverage 0.0092 0.0092 0.0061 0.0060 
 (0.835) (0.832) (0.647) (0.643) 
Log (CFO Age) -0.0166* -0.0165 -0.0095 -0.0095 
 (1.653) (1.630) (1.074) (1.074) 
Log (CFO Tenure) 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 
 (0.320) (0.297) (0.422) (0.393) 
CEO is Chair 0.0039 0.0038 0.0053*** 0.0052*** 
 (1.630) (1.611) (2.638) (2.599) 
Constant -0.0043 -0.0045 -0.0253 -0.0247 
 (0.109) (0.114) (0.717) (0.696) 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Observations 3,692 3,692 4,822 4,822 
Appendix 8: Robustness – Matched Sample 
Table A8 
Accruals and CFO Awards- Matched Sample 
This table presents the replication of Table 5 by employing the matched sample. The matching 
process and the construction of the matched sample are described in the text. The fixed effect 
regressions and the dependent variables are described in Table 5. Other variables are defined as 
described in Appendix 2. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th of the distribution. 
Absolute values of t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
Panel A: Magnitude of Accruals and CFO Awards 
 |DA1| 
(1) 
|DA1| 
 (2) 
|DA2| 
 (3) 
|DA2| 
 (4) 
Post-Award (t+1) to (t+3) -0.0038***  -0.0036**  
 (2.727)  (2.541)  
Pre-Award (t-2)  -0.0052*  -0.0048 
  (1.692)  (1.579) 
Pre-Award (t-1)  -0.0022  -0.0022 
  (0.889)  (0.879) 
Award Year  -0.0033  -0.0025 
  (1.246)  (0.944) 
Post-Award (t+1)  -0.0052**  -0.0046* 
  (2.211)  (1.919) 
Post-Award (t+2)  -0.0061**  -0.0045* 
  (2.440)  (1.828) 
Post-Award (t+3)  -0.0047*  -0.0058** 
  (1.928)  (2.427) 
CFO PPS 0.0203*** 0.0196*** 0.0161** 0.0155** 
 (2.705) (2.610) (2.151) (2.074) 
CEO PPS 0.0021 0.0023 0.0032 0.0034 
 (0.476) (0.521) (0.719) (0.769) 
CEO PI 0.0008 0.0008 0.0006 0.0005 
 (0.982) (0.907) (0.687) (0.610) 
Firm Size -0.0032* -0.0032* -0.0031* -0.0031* 
 (1.882) (1.883) (1.794) (1.811) 
Indu. Adj. ROA 0.0078 0.0079 0.0090 0.0090 
 (0.626) (0.633) (0.711) (0.716) 
Indu. Adj. Stock return -0.0033 -0.0030 -0.0045 -0.0043 
 (1.006) (0.927) (1.383) (1.317) 
BTM -0.0081*** -0.0081*** -0.0077*** -0.0077*** 
 (3.070) (3.061) (2.904) (2.900) 
CF vol._3yr 0.0622 0.0607 0.0718 0.0704 
 (1.321) (1.295) (1.578) (1.550) 
Sales growth 0.0008 0.0011 -0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.257) (0.340) (0.033) (0.026) 
Leverage -0.0103 -0.0106 -0.0090 -0.0093 
 (0.935) (0.965) (0.832) (0.860) 
Log (CFO Age) -0.0179* -0.0183* -0.0188* -0.0192** 
 (1.762) (1.808) (1.935) (1.978) 
Table A8, Continued 
 
    
Log (CFO Tenure) -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.0023 
 (1.467) (1.437) (1.519) (1.503) 
CEO is Chair -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 
 (0.585) (0.631) (0.663) (0.676) 
Constant 0.1373*** 0.1411*** 0.1407*** 0.1444*** 
 (3.425) (3.528) (3.616) (3.714) 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Observations 4,287 4,287 4,287 4,287 
 
  
Table A8, Continued 
Panel B: Signed Accruals and CFO Awards 
 DA1 
(1) 
DA1 
(2) 
DA2 
(3) 
DA2 
(4) 
Post-Award (t+1) to (t+3) -0.0018  -0.0019  
 (0.956)  (0.987)  
Pre-Award (t-2)  -0.0044  -0.0043 
  (1.137)  (1.105) 
Pre-Award (t-1)  -0.0041  -0.0040 
  (1.154)  (1.129) 
Award Year  -0.0043  -0.0042 
  (1.430)  (1.404) 
Post-Award (t+1)  -0.0064**  -0.0064** 
  (2.308)  (2.302) 
Post-Award (t+2)  -0.0058**  -0.0059** 
  (1.999)  (2.017) 
Post-Award (t+3)  0.0025  0.0024 
  (0.778)  (0.767) 
CFO PPS 0.0201** 0.0189** 0.0202** 0.0190** 
 (2.394) (2.257) (2.391) (2.258) 
CEO PPS -0.0122** -0.0122** -0.0123** -0.0123** 
 (2.208) (2.206) (2.211) (2.209) 
CEO PI 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0013 
 (1.046) (1.078) (1.094) (1.125) 
Firm Size -0.0033 -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.0031 
 (1.637) (1.584) (1.592) (1.540) 
Indu. Adj. ROA 0.0036 0.0036 0.0160 0.0160 
 (0.211) (0.209) (0.932) (0.928) 
Indu. Adj. Stock return 0.0009 0.0012 0.0019 0.0021 
 (0.216) (0.263) (0.430) (0.476) 
BTM -0.0068** -0.0069** -0.0069** -0.0070** 
 (2.121) (2.133) (2.148) (2.160) 
CF vol._3yr -0.0181 -0.0193 -0.0197 -0.0209 
 (0.331) (0.355) (0.356) (0.379) 
Sales growth 0.0079* 0.0084** 0.0084** 0.0089** 
 (1.945) (2.044) (2.074) (2.170) 
Leverage -0.0202 -0.0207 -0.0203 -0.0207 
 (1.444) (1.480) (1.443) (1.478) 
Log (CFO Age) -0.0143 -0.0144 -0.0151 -0.0152 
 (1.055) (1.056) (1.104) (1.105) 
Log (CFO Tenure) 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 
 (0.059) (0.103) (0.054) (0.097) 
CEO is Chair -0.0016 -0.0019 -0.0016 -0.0019 
 (0.734) (0.860) (0.732) (0.856) 
Constant 0.0897 0.0910 0.0802 0.0814 
 (1.624) (1.640) (1.440) (1.457) 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Observations 4,287 4,287 4,287 4,287 
Table A8, Continued 
Panel C: Signed Accruals and CFO Awards – Positive Accruals 
 DA1+ 
(1) 
DA1+ 
(2) 
DA2+ 
(3) 
DA2+ 
(4) 
Post-Award (t+1) to (t+3) -0.0043***  -0.0035**  
 (2.711)  (2.119)  
Pre-Award (t-2)  -0.0065*  -0.0064* 
  (1.707)  (1.653) 
Pre-Award (t-1)  -0.0038  -0.0052* 
  (1.351)  (1.799) 
Award Year  -0.0051*  -0.0034 
  (1.822)  (1.088) 
Post-Award (t+1)  -0.0086***  -0.0071** 
  (3.187)  (2.451) 
Post-Award (t+2)  -0.0058**  -0.0039 
  (2.145)  (1.382) 
Post-Award (t+3)  -0.0045*  -0.0050* 
  (1.788)  (1.881) 
CFO PPS 0.0134 0.0119 0.0182** 0.0170* 
 (1.583) (1.415) (2.001) (1.879) 
CEO PPS -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0051 -0.0052 
 (0.595) (0.595) (0.974) (0.980) 
CEO PI 0.0016* 0.0016* 0.0014 0.0014 
 (1.853) (1.849) (1.380) (1.335) 
Firm Size -0.0033* -0.0032* -0.0044** -0.0042** 
 (1.886) (1.798) (2.311) (2.206) 
Indu. Adj. ROA -0.0072 -0.0068 -0.0075 -0.0074 
 (0.469) (0.440) (0.429) (0.423) 
Indu. Adj. Stock return -0.0049 -0.0047 -0.0038 -0.0037 
 (1.299) (1.238) (0.961) (0.937) 
BTM -0.0077*** -0.0078*** -0.0111*** -0.0109*** 
 (2.886) (2.856) (3.150) (3.119) 
CF vol._3yr 0.0253 0.0258 0.0110 0.0114 
 (0.500) (0.513) (0.217) (0.227) 
Sales growth 0.0051 0.0058* 0.0050 0.0056 
 (1.494) (1.667) (1.331) (1.468) 
Leverage -0.0230** -0.0234** -0.0273*** -0.0277*** 
 (2.385) (2.435) (2.664) (2.701) 
Log (CFO Age) -0.0278*** -0.0284*** -0.0279** -0.0282** 
 (2.652) (2.705) (2.532) (2.552) 
Log (CFO Tenure) 0.0002 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0000 
 (0.130) (0.228) (0.049) (0.007) 
CEO is Chair -0.0027 -0.0029 -0.0022 -0.0023 
 (1.451) (1.525) (1.068) (1.122) 
Constant 0.1766*** 0.1801*** 0.1861*** 0.1887*** 
 (4.104) (4.196) (4.111) (4.168) 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Observations 3,220 3,220 2,834 2,834 
Table A8, Continued 
Panel D: Signed Accruals and CFO Awards – Negative Accruals 
 DA1- 
(1) 
DA1- 
(2) 
DA2- 
(3) 
DA2- 
(4) 
Post-Award (t+1) to (t+3) 0.0050  0.0055*  
 (1.608)  (1.964)  
Pre-Award (t-2)  -0.0012  -0.0026 
  (0.201)  (0.498) 
Pre-Award (t-1)  -0.0029  -0.0046 
  (0.562)  (1.100) 
Award Year  -0.0019  0.0009 
  (0.302)  (0.198) 
Post-Award (t+1)  0.0010  0.0014 
  (0.208)  (0.329) 
Post-Award (t+2)  0.0027  0.0041 
  (0.484)  (0.893) 
Post-Award (t+3)  0.0125**  0.0133*** 
  (2.367)  (2.610) 
CFO PPS -0.0435*** -0.0425*** -0.0257** -0.0255** 
 (3.129) (3.049) (2.080) (2.094) 
CEO PPS -0.0107 -0.0112 -0.0123 -0.0124 
 (1.158) (1.211) (1.498) (1.526) 
CEO PI -0.0012 -0.0010 0.0006 0.0008 
 (0.529) (0.457) (0.347) (0.413) 
Firm Size 0.0048* 0.0048* 0.0023 0.0021 
 (1.797) (1.743) (0.859) (0.788) 
Indu. Adj. ROA -0.0316** -0.0323** -0.0228* -0.0225* 
 (2.175) (2.206) (1.688) (1.693) 
Indu. Adj. Stock return 0.0000 0.0004 0.0013 0.0010 
 (0.003) (0.052) (0.217) (0.167) 
BTM 0.0095 0.0096 0.0045 0.0044 
 (1.340) (1.387) (1.367) (1.360) 
CF vol._3yr -0.0502 -0.0528 -0.0849 -0.0857 
 (0.707) (0.745) (1.364) (1.377) 
Sales growth 0.0118* 0.0121* 0.0075 0.0078 
 (1.848) (1.902) (1.283) (1.326) 
Leverage 0.0075 0.0078 0.0016 0.0017 
 (0.273) (0.286) (0.070) (0.072) 
Log (CFO Age) -0.0304 -0.0290 -0.0166 -0.0152 
 (1.238) (1.165) (0.879) (0.811) 
Log (CFO Tenure) 0.0110*** 0.0108*** 0.0085*** 0.0082*** 
 (3.216) (3.146) (2.952) (2.826) 
CEO is Chair 0.0016 0.0011 0.0016 0.0012 
 (0.377) (0.255) (0.539) (0.387) 
Constant 0.0188 0.0143 -0.0143 -0.0171 
 (0.210) (0.160) (0.195) (0.235) 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Observations 1,067 1,067 1,453 1,453 
